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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to determine the optimal amount 
of Rorschach protocol data required for maximal accuracy in person­
ality assessment when experience level of judges and degree of 
pathology of the subjects are taken into account. Confidence in 
judgment as it relates to the same three factors was also examined.
One hundred forty-four judges, consisting of 36 untrained 
undergraduates, 36 senior undergraduate psychology majors, 36 
graduate clinical psychology students, and 36 Ph.D.’s who were 
Fellows of the Society of Projective Techniques, or had indicated a 
special interest in projective techniques in the APA Directory, were 
used.
Six Rorschach tests were administered to persons represent­
ing Normal, Neurotic and Psychotic states of mental health. They 
were selected on the basis of their life situations, treatment condi­
tion, and results on the MMPI.
Case data was then divided into the following separate 
increments:
1 -Basic Identifying Data (BID): age, sex, level of educa­
tion, marital status, past and present treatment status, 
and occupation.
2 - BID plus Free Association and the Location Sheet (FA
and Loc).
3 - BID, FA, Loc, and Scoring based upon FA (Sc).
4 - BID, FA, Loc and Inquiry (Inq).
5 - BID. FA, Inq, Loc and Scoring based upon FA and Inq
(Scor).
6 - BID, FA, Inq, Loc, Scor and Testing of the Limits.
Each judge received a packet containing only one of the
foregoing information conditions on a single case. After consider­
ing the data, a judge was required to delineate the protocol subject, 
utilizing the California Q-sort as a descriptive device. The . 
criterion for each case consisted of a consensual CQ-sort obtained 
from persons well acquainted with the subjects.
Confidence in judgment was expressed quantitatively In the 
form of "percentage right," and subjectively in the form of self- 
evaluation of performance on a .5 point scale ranging from 5 for "Very 
Well" to 1 for "Very Poorly."
It was found that;
1 - There was an inverse relationship between level of train­
ing and judgmental accuracy, regardless of type of proto­
col or amount of information available.
2 - Increased amounts of data resulted in decreased levels
of accuracy.
3 - BID used by itself was productive of more accuracy than
any of the Rorschach data conditions. It exceeded Total 
Rorschach Data at the .01 level, and the FA/Inq combina­
tion at the .05 level of significance.
4 - The best Rorschach data source for use with Normals and
Neurotics was the FA/Sc combination. Verbalization was 
more crucial in the assessment of Psychotics and the FA 
condition by itself was most productive for that level 
of pathology.
5 - Psychotics could be discriminated from the Normals at the
.01 level, and they could be discriminated from the 
Neurotics at the .05 level of significance. In general, 
there was a positive relationship between accuracy and 
the degree of pathology of the subject.
6 - Less trained judges were most accurate with Normal re­
cords, and more trained judges were most accurate with 
Psychotic records.
7 - There was positive relationship between training and the
tendency to over-estimate pathology of subjects.
8 - Confidence did not increase as the amount of data in­
creased, and it did not alter with regard to type of 
protocol.
9 - Most of the judges estimated their performances as being
Fair or average, and thus no difference in subjective 
estimates of confidence was found. There was an inverse 
relationship between the quantitative estimate of confid­
ence and training, however. This difference appeared to 
be a reflection of degree of sophistication in statistical 
matters rather than differential confidence levels.
10 - Rorschach accuracy and Social Desirability of the subject
were related positively,
11 - Genotypic as well as phenotypic characteristics were
missed by the more trained judges.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The capacity for accurate judgment of people and prediction 
of behavior has probably always been a highly valued attribute. The 
judgment of Solomon for instance has been celebrated throughout re­
corded times and his resolution of the mat'ernity dilemma is well 
known. How one becomes a great judge like a Solon or Pericles has 
always been the subject of rumination for the layman as well as the 
scientist.
First efforts to examine the nature of judgment on a formal 
basis can be traced to the psychophysicists of the 19th century 
(Boring, 1950). Although early efforts of such pioneers as Fechner, 
Wundt and Muller were confined to investigations of judgments of 
relatively simple stimuli like light and sound, they were neverthe­
less important because they demonstrated that complex psychological 
processes could be discriminated scientifically. They also dis­
covered that judges varied in their ability to judge, and that all 
judgmental ability reached a ceiling beyond which accuracy became 
zero.
Man has always strived to push that ceiling higher and higher 
in an attempt to extend his powers of prediction, in both domestic 
and occupational life. One can observe this trend in a John Doe who 
"plays the horses" with a system, or in the case of Smith and Son 
who conduct a survey to determine what age group should be appealed 
to in order to market their new product successfully.
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By the 1930's professionals in the field of penal correction 
had hit upon the use of base rates as an aid in predicting if a 
candidate for parole might become subject to recidivism if released 
from prison (Gough, 1962). The method was simple and merely con­
sisted of matching candidate with a comparison group of previously 
released parolees, where the recidivism base rates had already been 
computed by counting actual incidences of parole violation. If it 
were found the candidate appeared to belong to a group that had been 
shown actuarially to have a high violation rate, the correction 
officer would most likely recommend continued incarceration, based 
upon the high probability of recidivism.
Some psychologists pointed out this mechanical process is de­
humanizing and missed extenuating factors which would favor a decision 
for parole. Others obversely emphasized accuracy and economy that 
the actuarial process afforded. Lundberg (1941) attempted to recon­
cile the two opposing factions by asserting that the clinician 
generally utilized an actuarial approach even if there were no formal 
use of base rate tables. It was his contention that the experienced 
clinician made accurate judgments by relying upon many cases that he 
had seen previously, and had employed to form subjective, internalized 
norms or base rates.
The issue went unattended for a number of years, except for a 
few investigators who would occasionally attempt to compare accuracy 
of clinical judgments and predictions with those now made possible 
by a more sophisticated actuarial process, the regression technique
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(Sarbin, 1943). The latter statistical method operated on the simple 
principle that if three (or more) numerical values covaried in a 
known fashion, then knowledge of all other values made possible an 
extrapolation of what the last value must be (Edwards, 1958). More­
over, development of the high speed computer has made this a rapid 
and attractive process, since it required little time of the clinician 
investigator.
Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction
Approximately two dozen studies comparing clinical and act­
uarial prediction had been completed by the 1950's when Meehl (1954) 
"fired the shot" that is still resounding throughout the world of 
clinical psychology today. In a slim volume entitled, Clinical Versus 
Statistical Prediction, he carefully examined all of the then known 
studies comparing the two methods and concluded that if the clinician 
was using actuarial techniques as Lundberg (1941) suggested, he was 
doing a poor job, since clinical prediction could only rarely equal 
the accuracy of actuarial prediction, and it never exceeded it. This 
was a rude awakening since most clinicians believed that an experi­
enced practitioner could never be bested by a simple and automatic 
mechanical process. Consequently, Meehl (1957) advised that wherever 
possible, the clinician should utilize a regression formula since it 
does a better and more accurate job.
It was not very long before there were a number of rejoinders. 
Zubin (1955) asserted there was no quarrel at all, because both tech­
niques could and should be used in combination to exact the greatest
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possible advantage. McArthur (1955) on the other hand justifiably 
emphasized that the statistical approach was favored in the cited 
studies, because clinicians were asked to use unfamiliar instruments 
to make judgments about unfamiliar events. His most important ob­
servation was the fact that different data was usually employed for 
the two types of prediction and hence they were not truly comparable 
processes in most of the studies. Most subsequent investigations 
corrected for this valid criticism, but the clinician still tended 
to run a disappointing second best (Hunt and Jones, 1962).
Perhaps the most cogent analysis of the situation was pre­
sented by Holt (1958) in an article that stimulated hope that clini­
cal procedures might still be properly vindicated. He urged that a 
minimum condition for any accurate clinical judgment would have to 
include five basic steps in order for the clinician to demonstrate 
his ability. First there would have to be a job analysis or a process 
of familiarization with that which must be evaluated. Secondly, one 
would have to know what intervening variable would need to be consid­
ered if the behavior is to be predicted. Next it would be necessary 
to identify the appropriate data that could afford measures of the 
intervening variables identified as relevant. Fourth, one would have 
to gather the data to give measures to the intervening variables, and 
finally the data must be combined to yield a prediction.
Perhaps the most heuristic prescription advanced by Holt 
(1958) in this article, which has become a landmark in the contro­
versy, is that position that, "One kind of comparative study might
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teach us something even though it would be hard to do properly: 
simultaneous attempts to predict the same criterion from the same 
data by clinicians and statisticians who have gone through the same 
preliminary steps. As the statistician studies the original group 
to determine the critical scores for his multiple cutting point 
formula (or whatever), the clinician will study the configurations 
of these scores in individuals of known performance," In summary, 
Holt suggested that clinicians need to become familiar with a task, 
use the same data as the statistical method, and then he must be 
given the benefit of feedback or knowledge of results concerning 
his initial judgments.
The value of feedback has been well documented as a facili­
tator of performance in a variety of learning situations (Woodworth 
and Schlosberg, 1954), Dailey (1952) demonstrated that clinical 
judgments about case material became more accurate as feedback on 
judgment was continued. Fancher (1966) used the same case material 
and obtained essentially the same results. Whether or not adherence 
to Holt's prescriptions enabled the clinician to exceed actuarial 
prediction still remains to be demonstrated, however. Sawyer (1966) 
recently reviewed and analyzed 45 studies providing valid compari­
sons of techniques and concluded that clinical predictions exceed 
statistical predictions under some but still not all conditions.
Prior to 1965 investigators were able to show the value of 
feedback for raising the level of accuracy of clinical judgment but 
no one was able to present data where statistical accuracy was
6
exceeded. Goldberg (1959) showed students could exceed their teachers 
in accuracy if they were told which predictors to use in differentiat­
ing organic from non-organic Bender-Gestalt figure duplications, but 
an untrained secretary was able to exceed both groups with the aid of 
regression formulae, Oskamp (1962) found the identification of valid 
predictors helped, but did not cause judges to do better than a 
formula in differentiating psychotic from non-psychotic MMPI profiles. 
Similar results were obtained by Lee and Tucker (1962) and Newton 
(1965). Newton found that feedback on how well an instrument corre­
lated with the criterion was more meaningful than mere reporting on 
the subject's hit rate, Sechrest et al, (1967) recently completed 
three studies that all demonstrated the validity of feedback, but it 
was discovered that feedback may be just as valuable as a source of 
motivation as it is a source of information.
It was not until 1965 that it could be demonstrated, as Holt 
(1958) had anticipated, that the clinician could exceed the formula 
in accuracy, if prediction was made from the same data and feedback 
was made available (Lindzey, 1965). In a paper entitled, Seer Over 
Sign, Lindzey discussed a two part study where clinicians were able 
to identify TAT records of homosexuals with significantly greater 
accuracy than an actuarial formula that was ineffective on cross- 
validation. Even Meehl (1965) acknowledged this as the first legiti­
mate instance where clinical judgment exceeded statistical prediction. 
Since that time two studies which reinforced this trend have appeared 
in the current literature. Imig (1967) found that 75% of his judges
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exceeded a regression formula in predicting college freshman failure, 
and Strieker (1967) demonstrated that judges could exceed statistical 
accuracy in identifying adolescent patient figure drawings if they 
had the benefit of knowing what predictors to emphasize.
The clinical versus actuarial controversy is by no means re­
solved. Watley (1966, 1967a, 1967b) recently completed a series of 
studies wherein the statistical procedure was found superior and 
feedback in the mere form of hits and misses produced no improvements 
at all. What has been the upshot of all the controversy? It's value 
would seem to lie in the awakening of the realization in clinicians 
that procedures must be examined and instruments and skills must be 
sharpened wherever possible (Rotter, 1967). By now, it is well 
accepted that the most intelligent approach to clinical tasks would 
be to utilize a combined approach (Thorne, 1960). Where actuarial 
techniques are not available one would still have to rely upon the 
best clinical methods at our disposal (Meehl, 1957). Since high speed 
computers are not commonly available and cannot be brought into the 
diagnostic or therapeutic treatment room, such occurrences will be 
numerous. Therefore, a vital need to identify the factors related 
to accurate judgment and prediction still exists (Little, 1967).
Factors in Clinical Judgment and Prediction
The large body of data that has thus far been collected can 
be profitably approached by an analysis of separate variables dis­
covered to be relevant. These are variables related to the nature of
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judge, subject, the process itself and lastly the material of the 
judgment, the data source.
Judge Variables 
Training and Experience
One of the most surprising and paradoxical findings of the 
investigations has been the fact that untrained, inexperienced judges 
were found to do as well as, or better than, experienced clinical psy­
chologists in a variety of judging tasks. Trained judges almost always 
did significantly better than chance when predicting, but so did un­
trained judges (Cline, 1955; Goldberg, 1959; Oskamp, 1962). This find­
ing was apparently so consistent Bieri e± al. (1966) claimed that "it 
is hard to find studies where there have been systematic differences 
between trained and untrained judges." It is not hard to find such 
studies (Sines, 1959; Grigg, 1960; Stelmachers and McHugh, 1964), but 
the fact remains that although it would be expected professionals would 
be consistently more accurate, they generally did not do better (Soskin, 
1954; Goldberg, 1959; Horowitz, 1962; Grebstein, 1963), and in at least 
four cases definitely were poorer (Luft, 1951; Weiss, 1963; Lindzey, 
1965; Strieker, 1967).
Within this area however, results must be examined carefully 
before they can be accepted. In some cases investigators misuse the 
term "clinician" and merely end up comparing two groups of inexperi­
enced subjects (Cline and Richards, 1963). Little (1967) pointed out 
that Sechrest _ej: a^. (1967) make generalizations about clinicians in 
their study although it was based upon undergraduates who may not have
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been capable of even completing undergraduate school. In such cases 
it is questionable that the investigator is validly demonstrating 
poorer clinical performance.
Another criticism involves the judgmental task that is 
usually selected as the dependent variable. In many instances a simpli­
fied task, dichotomous in structure, is selected in order to make it 
feasible to secure performances of the untrained. The simplified task 
is oftentimes artificial and unfamiliar to the clinician. Moreover, 
it does not allow the clinician to demonstrate high level skills, 
because no provision is made for the expression of specific rather than 
gross observations and judgments. Under such conditions the untrained 
subject is favored because he is only capable of gross observations 
and is never required to perform at levels that may be unreachable for 
him.
In the past the clinician had been able to demonstrate excel­
lence, but only when data had been kept at a minimum and experience 
alone could be relied upon to make performance superior (Luft, 1951; 
Weiss, 1963). He should be able to exhibit the effects of advanced 
training providing the measured behavior involves complex tasks which 
allow not gross, but highly qualified, job-related differentiations.
Confidence
In 1962, Oskamp discovered an interesting phenomenon concern­
ing relationships between level of training, accuracy of judgment, and 
confidence of the judge. Students were almost always more sure than 
experts of the correctness of their differential judgments involving
10
patient and non-patient MMPI Profiles. In addition, he discovered an 
inverse relationship between confidence and judgmental accuracy. This 
finding has been duplicated in eleven different investigations employ­
ing different instruments and data sources beginning in 1929 (Valentine) 
to the present (Watley, 1966b).
Investigators have obtained conflicting results when investi­
gating the relationship between confidence and amount of available data. 
Oskamp (1965) observed confidence levels increased progressively as a 
function of increased data, but in Gordon's (1966) study these results 
were not secured. Level of confidence remained the same whether 
students had few or many projective test responses to make judgments. 
Discrepancies between the two studies can probably be explained ade­
quately by differences in the relationship between data provided and 
the tasks. Increased data altered confidence levels only when they 
could in fact make some difference in the execution of the task.
Oskamp (1965) provided large and relevant increments in data, while 
Gordon (1966) provided small, disconnected increments of two projective 
responses per step.
Lastly, Watley (1967b) showed that the inverse relationship be­
tween confidence and judgmental accuracy cannot be easily altered 
even when feedback is involved. Low accurate, high confident judges 
were apprised of their limited accuracy in predicting college freshman 
grade point averages, but they did not alter estimates of confidence 
and did not increase accuracy when asked to predict again for a new 
sample.
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The implications of the preceding sections are clear. Train­
ing and self-confidence were no guarantee of judgmental accuracy.
More experienced clinicians tended to be more conservative than novi­
tiates, and therefore were more appropriate in the estimation of their 
skills (Oskamp, 1962, 1965), but self-satisfaction in judgments appar­
ently was not a dependable index of judgmental accuracy (Bieri, 1966).
In the last analysis expertness could be validly assumed only where 
there had been verification of accuracy (Meehl, 1956b). Even where 
lack of expertness could be demonstrated, it appeared that it was diffi­
cult to persuade clinicians to alter their self-evaluations and examine 
their customary means of operating (Watley, 1967b).
Cognitive Style
Another factor which could effect judgmental accuracy is related 
to the cognitive style or structure of the judge. Sarbin ej: _al. (1960) 
felt that judgment proceeded by a deductive thought process dependent 
upon subjective categories qr̂  classifications formulated on the basis 
of past experiences. Incoming data were matched with specific cate­
gories, and once matched formed the basis of a clinical inference. 
Therefore, cognitive structure would be a reference to "enduring patterns 
of organization in the person's representation of the social and physical 
environment" (Bieri et_ a_l., 1966). Bieri (1955) and others have studied 
what effects the level of cognitive complexity could have upon the 
process of prediction. One would postulate on an a priori basis that 
added cognitive complexity of a judge would be more desirable because 
it would presumably lead to finer discriminations and hence to higher
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accuracy, but results do not support this contention.
Bieri (1955) found that "complex" judges emphasized differ­
ences while "simple" judges emphasized similarities between themselves 
and subjects, so that judgmental accuracy depended on whether the sub­
ject was in fact different from or similar to the judges. Leventhal 
(1957) examined the relationship between amount of data and complexity 
of judges. Judges were more accurate with less data if they were 
"cognitively complex," but they became confused with added inputs and 
their accuracy was reduced below that of "cognitively simple" judges.
Fancher (1966) divided a group of Harvard students along the 
complexity dimension and found that high and low complexity judges 
were more accurate in predicting behavior from case material when com­
pared to medium complex judges. A complete account of current research 
on cognitive style can be obtained by referring to Sarbin et al. (1960) 
and Bieri et al. (1966), but studies to this point do not provide 
final evidence as to the importance of cognitive style in the judgmen­
tal process.
Personality
It is known, however, that some judges in every study demon­
strated high levels of accuracy on a consistent basis. Others have 
consistently demonstrated low levels of accuracy and it has been sensibly 
urged that a careful study of each group of judges will aid in discover­
ing what traits are valuable for accurate clinical judgment (Meehl,
1954a; Thorne, 1960; Watley, 1966a). Taft (1955) in the initial re­
view on the subject pointed out;
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The contradictions found between studies may be due partly to 
low reliability of the measures used, and partly to the effect 
of specific factors such as type of judgment required, the traits 
being judged, and the subjects used. This problem of specificity 
arises with all traits, but it seems to be particularly marked in 
the case of the ability to judge others. . . .
Despite continued difficulties, a number of reliable traits relating to
ability to predict have been isolated.
Judges who showed highly accurate predictions have been observed 
to possess high intellectual ability (Cline, 1955; Taft, 1955), a 
capacity for abstraction (Kelly and Fiske, 1951; Cline, 1955; Watley, 
1966a), and orderliness (Watley, 1966a; Van Atta, 1966), but not to 
extreme lengths (Baker and Block, 1957). They can tolerate disorder 
(Van Atta, 1966), are ambitious and achieve scholastically (Tomlinson, 
1967), but do not overestimate their capacities (Oskamp, 1962, 1965) 
and even tend to be exhibitionistic (Tomlinson, 1967), but they possess 
a sensitivity to the generalized other (Taft, 1955) and in their inter­
personal behavior seem to be empathic (Fancher, 1966) while at the same 
time are found to be objective and non-judgmental (Fancher, 1967).
High accurate judges tend to be free of ethnocentrism and authoritar­
ianism (Cline, 1955), and seem to be moderately dogmatic (Weingold, 
1967).
Taft (1955) emphasized the importance of motivation for high 
accuracy, and Sechrest ^t al. (1967) also stressed this element in 
three recent studies. These results would appear consistent with 
Gordon's (1966) findings that high ego involvement leads to high 
accuracy. Insight into one's own personality (Mueller, 1963) and 
that of one's peers (Taft, 1955) were also helpful, but must be
14
accompanied by good social adjustment (Taft, 1955; Watley, 1966a) in 
order to be efficacious. Age was found a factor for children, but not 
for adults in accurate person perception (Taft, 1955). Females appeared 
to be better judges (Taft, 1955), but recent research (Tomlinson, 1967) 
reported no significant differences for sex, and therefore, this dimen­
sion is still in need of verification.'
General Ability
Whether or not the high accurate judge would have the capacity 
to predict accurately in all situations has remained unverified also, 
and it is not known if there are people who possess general factors for 
judging. Common sense experience would seem to indicate the affirma­
tive, but research to date has not supported such a contention.
Holsopple and Phelan (1954) observed that judges were able to 
match a variety of separate test protocols such as the Rorschach test, 
the TAT, the Kuder, etc., with case data on a consistently high or low 
level or range of performance. Cline and Richards (1960) also found 
' that judges were able to evaluate filmed interview data in a consis­
tent fashion, and like the previously mentioned researchers concluded 
that a general factor for judging must exist. Fancher (1966) believed 
that he was observing a general factor when he noted a general level 
of excellence in predicting behavior from case history data. Since 
all of the foregoing studies have examined the judgmental process in 
regard to only a single type of task it seems valid to conclude that 
not all tasks will be accomplished with equal accuracy.
In order to assess a general factor one would have to identify
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high and low accurate judges and demonstrate consistent performance 
across different types of tasks (i.e., absolute, differential, match­
ing, configurational, etc.) with different types of data and material 
(i.e., objective, projective, case, observational, etc.). No such 
definitive study has been executed, but Goldberg and Werts (1966) have 
come closest to the ideal using Campbell and Fiske's Multitrait- 
multimethod approach. They have shown that intra-judge reliability 
for a trait rating is low when a judge uses a variety of instruments 
like the Rorschach Test, MMPI, and WAIS. They have also shown that 
the ability to judge a trait is directly related and dependent upon 
the instrument that was employed and also the type of trait that was 
being examined. Crow and Hammond came to the same conclusions in 1957. 
The question of a general factor for judging remains unanswered and 
awaits further research findings.
Subject Related Variables
Much less evidence has been accumulated pertaining to effects 
that the object of the judgment has upon the judgmental process.
Schafer (1954) has stressed the need to explore the influence of 
direct interpersonal contact upon psychometric judgmental processes. 
Baer (1950) has shown that the patient may be affected by his own 
dynamics in responding to the examiner, and Thorne (1960) warned that 
the subject may arouse powerful feelings of transference within the 
therapist, making him prone to numerous errors of judgment. Yet very 
little has been done to examine the significance of object variables.
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Personality
One of the earliest conceptualizations in the research litera­
ture was the realization that high accuracy was attained when the 
subject resembled or was similar to the judge (Taft, 1955; Gage and 
Cronbach, 1955). Dymond showed (1953) that a subject could also be 
dissimilar and judgmental accuracy would still be high, provided the 
subject was markedly and obviously different. These results have since 
been verified by Stelmachers and McHugh (1964) so that this factor 
appears to be stable.
Subjects who were conformists and wished to present themselves 
in a favorable light (Baker and Block, 1957) could be appraised 
accurately. Rigid individuals who were observed and judged to over­
controlling by psychologists were also found highly predictable (Baker 
and Block, 1957). Mueller (1963) showed that insight level was re­
lated to person perception. Responses of subjects on Horney's Activity 
Index were predicted accurately if they had high levels of insight. 
Beyond these few facts little was known about the personality of the 
subject and its effect upon judgmental accuracy. Since personality of 
the subject appears to be influential, more investigation and research 
is needed in this area.
Diagnosis and Pathology
The study of pathology of the object to be judged has been sub­
ject to the same neglect and this may be due to the difficulties 
inherent in employing a diagnostic category as a criterion measure.
Ash (1949) warned about using diagnostic labels as criteria for research
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when he showed there was only 31.4 to 43.57, agreement in specific 
diagnostic categories between expert psychiatrists. Agreement was 
higher, 57.9 to 67.470, when categories were made broad, but results 
were still considered disappointing.
Schmidt and Fonda (1952) pointed out that lack of reliability 
may have been due to the utilization of unofficial, unfamiliar classi­
fications. They replicated Ash's study with the approved, Standardized 
American Psychiatric Association Nomenclature and obtained acceptable 
results (an R ranging from .73 to .95) for three major categories, 
characterological, organic and psychotic. However, agreement was 
significantly reduced when subtypes of disorders were diagnosed, and 
it vanished almost completely when agreement was required for the Per­
sonality Pattern and Trait Disorders classifications.
Zigler and Philips (1961) in an excellent review on the problem 
of diagnosis and its current status, reached an apparently reliable 
conclusion; diagnosis can be accurate on a broad, but not a narrow 
basis. When broad categories are employed they can be reliable and 
useful. Watkins and Stauffacher (1957) found that degrees of pathology 
could be detected by means of the Rorschach Test. Judges were able to 
differentiate psychotics from normals and neurotics just on the basis 
of their verbal behavior and deviant thought patterns. This could be 
accomplished even by naive judges, since schizophrenic patients could 
be identified solely on the basis of taped excerpts (Cohen, 1960). 
Lastly, Shontz (1956) advocated that diagnoses could be made specific 
if a quantitative method was used, since he was able to obtain agreement
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on Normal and Hospitalized patient stereotypes (Rs of .68 and .59 
respectively) when a Q-sort method was used as a medium of common ex­
pression. Kostlan (1954) and others have indicated that different 
forms of pathology are difficult to judge or predict, and these studies 
show conclusively they can be approached profitably by a broad attack, 
and also assessed for effects they can have upon the clinical process.
Process Related Variables
Probably the most researched area of prediction has been the 
process and method of judgment itself. The need to delineate and 
understand the significant influences of procedure was recognized early 
(Sarbin, 1943; Meehl, 1959a; McArthur, 1955), and a number of models 
have been proposed to aid in the study of the process, but no single 
system has been proven significantly heuristic or outstanding.
Sarbin et_ al. (1960) advanced a cognitive hypothetico-deductive 
system; Meehl (1954a) and Hoffman (1960) prefer a mathematical-configura­
tional analogue. Bieri jajt aJ. (1966) and Attneave (1959) used an infor­
mation theory approach, while Hammond _et al, (1964) recommended a 
representative design based on Brunswik's Lens Model scheme. Hunt and 
Jones (1962) did not subscribe to any specific school of theory, but 
they urged the study of judgment via a carefully controlled psychophysi­
cal paradigm. The most practical results seem to have been obtained 
by disregarding theoretical- biases and constructing relevant, but care­
ful research designed to investigate specific factors.
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Stereotyping
It is known that judges use stereotypes as guides when they 
judge subject behavior, and the more accurate the stereotype the 
greater is found the accuracy of behavior prediction. According to 
English and English (1958), a stereotype is "a relatively rigid and 
oversimplified or biased perception or conception of an aspect of 
reality, especially of persons or social groups. . . . "  Although 
they described the stereotype as possessing a negative aspect because 
it is rigid or biased, it appeared that this element of stability be­
came positive for the judgmental process, because it afforded a 
reliable background, foundation or informal base rate on which others 
could be accurately perceived with a minimum of data (Kostlan, 1954; 
Sines, 1959; Soskin, 1959).
The stereotype used depends largely upon the object to be 
judged and therefore is potentially variable, but the most common 
method involved comparing the subject with one's own self-image or 
self-stereotype (Dymond, 1953). Stelmachers and McHugh (1964) com­
pared the efficacy of employing three different stereotypes, Normal, 
Socially Desirable and the Self Stereotypes, They found that the 
self stereotype was most useful for it provided a clear basis for com­
parison and permitted assessment by means of an assumed similarity or 
dissimilarity.
The process can be a powerful aid so that judges who had only 
identifying data could make predictions as accurately as those made by 
judges who viewed sound film interviews, if they utilized accurate 
stereotypes (Geertsma and Stoller, I960). The dimension of assumed
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similarity is such a useful springboard that Taft (1955) cautioned 
about neglecting to account for its effect in interpreting the results 
of early research. He felt that one possible explanation for the poor 
results of clinicians was the fact that untrained judges could correctly 
rely upon assumed similarity since they belonged to the same age group, 
but the older Ph.D.'s did not have the same advantage.
Stereotypes have been shown to be reliable and resistant to 
alteration over time (Crow and Hammond, 1957), and since they did make 
large contributions to the clinical process deserve study in and of 
themselves. However, the capacity to predict accurately depends upon 
more than just stereotyping ability. When students were called upon 
to make predictions about a variety of subject behaviors after seeing 
sound color film interviews, and the results were factor analyzed to 
partial out the effect of stereotyping ability (Cline and Richards, 
1960), it was found that accuracy in prediction depended upon two 
factors, sensitivity to the generalized other and interpersonal accur­
acy, This could be designated Stereotype Accuracy and Differential 
Accuracy.
Gage and Cronbach (1955) pointed out as a consequence of the 
two factors a measure of accuracy is meaningless unless the prediction 
was analyzed for stereotyping accuracy and true or differential accur­
acy. Differential accuracy would then be a measure of how well a 
judge was able to assess unique traits or characteristics that were 
attributable to significant individual differences rather than to 
mere group membership. Borke and Fiske (1957) in effect showed that
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differential perception made a contribution since patient contact 
raised levels of accuracy beyond that attained on the basis of no con­
tact and just stereotyped judgment.
Both influences deserved further study. If the stereotype is 
withdrawn as a judgmental aid, by increasing sensitivity to individual 
differences, a marked reduction in accuracy occurred (Grow, 1957). 
Therefore, it would seem that a combination of the two approaches 
would be profitable, as Stelmachers and McHugh (1964) did in fact find 
that accurate assessment of psychotics could be established by apply­
ing a Normal Stereotype as a guideline and then determining what were 
specific areas of deviation.
Premature Conclusions
Another important variable in the process of judgment was the 
clinician's tendency to form hasty and premature conclusions with 
little supporting evidence (McArthur, 1954). It has been well estab­
lished in at least ten different investigations that judges formed 
conclusions on insufficient evidence (Kostlan, 1954), became locked 
in (Bieri, 1962) and then practically ignored subsequent incoming data 
(Dailey, 1952; Parker, 1958). The tendency became so rigid that 
Brieland (1959) was able to predict judge's evaluations of parents on 
the latter part of a two part interview by an estimation of their first 
impressions on the first part of the interview. Similar findings have 
been obtained with a variety of materials including psychometric data 
(Oskamp, 1962), case data (Parker, 1958) or interview data (Van Atta, 
1966).
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As would be expected those clinicians that formed premature 
hypotheses or conclusions had low rates of accuracy (Van Atta, 1966). 
This was probably because they heightened the chance of forming 
incorrect conceptualizations (Sarbin e£ al., 1960) and stressed 
invalid predictors (Hammond ej: al., 1964; Watley, 1966a), Experi­
enced clinicians seemed to be more prone to haste than inexperienced 
judges because they tended to use past experiences as a justification 
for risk-taking, despite an absence of any empirical support for sub­
jective convictions (Thorne, 1960). They were willing to take great 
leaps from the data (McArthur, 1954), thereby taking greater risks 
(Sarbin ej: al,, 1960) and consequently reduced their accuracy. The 
experienced clinician who was accurate seemed to proceed by forming a 
fluid conceptualization that was altered as data was received, so 
that a final personality assessment was based upon all of the incom­
ing data (Van Atta, 1966).
Inference and the Formation of Models
Just what principles governed the construction of personality 
formulations which were related to the process of inference and pre­
diction are still unknown and are largely confined to theoretical 
rumination rather than experimental manipulation, Sarbin ej: al,
(1960) have presented an ingenious cognitive deductive scheme involv­
ing the matching of data with subjective categories and classifica­
tions that are inter-related. According to them inference is a 
syllogistic process wherein the data on hand become the bases of the 
premises, and the final prediction is tantamount to the logical
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conclusion,
McArthur (1954) described the judgmental process as a continual 
elaboration based upon initial bursts of insight. As more data was 
received conceptualization proceeded from a broad, vague approximation 
about behavior to a finely elaborated, highly articulated and complete 
model of personality. The findings of Hebb (1949) and Piaget (1954) 
would seem to be consistent with and lend credence to a process of 
continual differentiation or "emergent synthesis" (Sundberg and Tyler, 
1962). After the synthesis, data would be collected from all sources 
and analyzed from a number of different aspects to form an integrated, 
implicit theory of personality and behavior. The implicit theory 
would then provide a frame of reference for most subsequent person 
perception and judgment (Thorne, 1960). Thorne (1960) believed that 
inductive reasoning was employed for the classification process once 
the implicit model was crystallized, but since there was no evidence 
to the contrary, the inferential process could be carried out by 
deductive or inductive reasoning, or a combination of the two.
Research has been completed on the nature of the judge's 
conceptual model. It is known for instance that people who are under­
controlled make inaccurate predictions, because they lacked conceptual 
frames of reference with which to process interpersonal data (Baker and 
Block, 1957). Over-controlled judges may have appropriate personality 
schemes but their high anxiety levels prevented sensitivity to incom­
ing data and accuracy was reduced because vital cues were never 
processed. Weingold (1967) has obtained results consistent with the
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foregoing, because he has discovered that low dogmatic judges (like 
the under-controlled judges above) make poor predictions and so do the 
judges found to be high dogmatic (like the over-controlled judges 
above) when dealing with case material. In addition to filtering out 
or ignoring relevant material, it was possible that overcontrolled- 
high dogmatic judges possess rigid and unyielding models of person^ 
ality that were applied inappropriately even when confronted with 
negative feedback (Watley, 1967b).
It might be postulated on an a priori basis that a highly dif­
ferentiated conceptual model would allow for greater specificity and 
therefore greater accuracy, but Parker (1958) investigated this 
variable and found no relationship between accuracy and the richness 
of the implicit theory possessed by the judge. It is known that 
models based upon Idiosyncratic categories or classifications were 
possessed more often by low accurate rather than by high accurate 
judges (Van Atta, 1966). Greater agreement on important personality 
categories was noted among accurate predictors. The type of concep­
tual approach that was used does not seem to have an effect on 
accuracy. Mathematical or verbal orientations were equally produc­
tive, providing nomothetic data were available for the first tech­
nique and idiographic inputs were available for the other (Fancher, 
1966).
Originally it was hypothesized that incoming data were 
processed on a configurational basis where observations were consid­
ered on a continual comparative basis (Meehl, 1959a). However, 
recent research seemed to indicate that an accurate judge processed
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data most efficiently on a linear, additive basis, giving weights to 
each piece of information in the form of subjective probabilities 
(Peterson and Beach, 1967), until the last piece of data was received 
and a final conclusion was formulated (Grebstein, 1963; Hammond et̂  
al,, 1964; Van Atta, 1966).
In conclusion, the judgmental process appears to be based 
upon an evaluation executed by means of an implicit, conceptual model 
or theory of personality. The model may be simple or highly complex, 
but failure to develop a framework for judgment at all produces low 
interpersonal predictive accuracy. Processing of incoming data may 
be accomplished with inductive or deductive reasoning or both, by 
means of a linear, additive method.
Miscellaneous Process Factors
There are a number of other relevant factors that effect the 
process of judgment. Sines (1959) has reported a primacy rather 
than a recency factor when judging, and data seen at the beginning 
of a battery were more influential than data seen later in the 
battery. Time was an influential factor. Judges tended to become 
much less reliable when they were given unlimited time to work over 
data (Huff and Friedman, 1967). Fatigue may be operant under such 
conditions, for Cummings (1954) found that judges became less accurate 
when rating the last cards of the Rorschach Test for an adjustment- 
maladjustment factor.
A good deal of work has been done on "anchoring" and its re­
lationship to prediction and judgment. Anchoring is a process whereby
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a perceptual response is determined not merely by the properties of 
the objects or data themselves but by a frame of reference provided 
by the judge on the basis of prior experience, bias, or in the case 
of primacy, by what has immediately preceded the object. The litera­
ture on anchoring and adaptation levels is extensive, and is men­
tioned only to point out that these factors are operant in shaping 
clinical decisions. A review on this area has been provided by Miller 
and Tripodi (1967) (for an account of the basic, relevant studies).
Data Related Variables
Two major aspects of the incoming data must be considered at 
length next, because they are vital to both the theoretical and 
applied clinicians. Research has uncovered astonishing paradoxes re­
lative to amount and type of data needed to be employed for valid con­
clusions and predictions.
Amount of Data
All training from grade school on has made the assumption that 
our decisions will be wise if we know all pertinent information and 
"get all the facts." Contrary to popular belief, it is well estab­
lished by now that an abundance of data may not only be unnecessary,
but it may produce confusion or inaccuracy (Bartlett et a_l., 1966).
%
Most studies investigating the contribution of varying amounts of 
information proceeded by means of an incremental design. Kostlan's
(1954) investigation was one of the first such studies and was classic
in its arrangement. His procedure required 20 psychologists to
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complete 283 true and false items based upon an exposure to all possi­
ble additive combinations of four data sources, the Rorschach Test, 
the Stein Incomplete Sentence Test, the MMPI, and social case data. 
Results were crucial and disillusioning. Minimal data (basic identi­
fying data, hereafter designated BID) permitted inferences with better 
than chance accuracy when used in isolation from the other sources. 
Social case history was the most helpful data source, for accuracy 
without it was reduced to that attainable with only BID, even if all 
three test data sources were used. Studies like this one show that 
some data sources are more important than others, and testing proce­
dures should be carefully examined to discover why that should be true. 
The present study is partially motivated by the remarkable results 
obtained by Kostlan, particularly since he found that the Rorschach 
test was the least helpful or valid in the judgment process.
Results of the Kostlan (1954) study should not have been a 
surprise to the much informed clinicians, since Kelly and Fiske 
(1951) had found earlier that predictions based on a credential file 
plus an objective test profile for psychology trainees could be just 
as valuable as judgments based on the foregoing materials plus projec­
tive techniques, interviews and situation tests. Soskin (1954, 1959), 
Sines (1959), Lee and Tucker (1962) and Weiss (1963) have replicated 
Kostlan's results with a variety of other types of data sources which 
included comparisons of objective, projective, interview and minimal 
data. Bartlett e_t a_l, (1966) have also shown that accuracy was reduced 
when judges predicted grade point averages from four predictors and
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were subsequently given 18 additional sources for consideration.
It is noteworthy, that Bartlett's study gave atypical results 
for Borke and Fiske (1957), Leventhal (1957), Horowitz (1962) and 
Stelmachers and McHugh (1964) by contrast have found that adding data 
increases rather than decreases accuracy. Unfortunately, additional 
data very rarely raised predictive accuracy beyond that obtained on 
the basis of different types of minimal data.
Type; Non-psychometric
Generally, it has been reported two types of minimal data have 
accounted for the bulk of judgmental accuracy, basic identifying data 
and social case data. These two data sources will be considered first 
and then the remaining types of clinical data (the interview, projec­
tive and objective test data) will be evaluated,
Basic Identifying Data (BID).--The list of investigators who 
have discovered the superiority of BID such as age, sex, occupation, 
level of education, marital status etc., is long (Kelly and Fiske,
— 1951; Dailey, 1952; Soskin, 1954; Holsopple and Phelan, 1954; Winch 
and More, 1956; Hathaway, 1956; Sines, 1959; Cline and Richards, 1960; 
Horowitz, 1962; Lee and Tucker, 1962; Weiss, 1963) and does not have 
to be fully elaborated herein. It may be that BID is significant be­
cause it provided all the clues that were necessary to formulate a 
stereotype that acted as a powerful judgmental guide. Cronbach
(1955) suggested directly that the judge is safest when judging from 
minimal data if he treats all subjects as though they were nearly
29
like each other, or by evoking an image of the average individual. 
Soskin (1954), Geertsma and Stoller (1960) and Oskamp (1965) stated 
that their judges were able to do well, seemingly because they evoked 
accurate stereotypes on the basis of just limited identifying data.
Social Case Data. On the other hand, several investigators 
have found that case data played a more prominent role. As mentioned 
above, Kostlan (1954) found BID significantly useful, but case data 
was indispensable in raising accuracy significantly higher. Little 
and Shneidman (1959) employed an extensive battery of data sources 
and estimated that anamnestic data was the most useful of all the data 
sources, including the MMPI and the Rorschach Test, and could account 
for all of the obtained accuracy by itself. Soskin (1959) and Miller 
and Bieri (1963) also reported the efficacy of case data, but made no 
comparisons with BID. Concerning case or anamnestic data, Winch and 
More (1956) found that biographical data added significant increments 
to predictive accuracy with three different types of progressively more 
structured interviews. However, King (1952) had shown that added case 
data can reduce reliability and accuracy if it was irrelevant to the 
task.
Whether BID or case data was superior is an academic issue, 
since the acquisition of either is dependent upon practical factors 
such as time and money available, and wherever possible the clinician 
usually obtains both basic identifying data (at least from charts) and 
complete anamnestic history from the patient in a direct interview 
(Thorne, 1960).
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Interviews.--Since the interview has played a key role in the 
clinical process, it has received considerable experimental analysis. 
In 1951, Luft reported that judges could predict a subject's responses 
to a multiple choice objective test on the basis of reading a tran­
script of an interview, almost as well as when they had the benefit of
hearing a tape of the interview, Luft concluded, "The voice in spon­
taneous speech tends to externalize significant underlying aspects of 
the personality which may not be apparent in the content of speech." 
Stated differently, the interviewer who wished to tap underlying 
dynamic processes was handicapped if he had to rely on a secondary 
source even if verbatim account.
Results of Borke and Fiske (1957) are difficult to interpret 
in relation to those obtained by Luft (1951), They reported that 
judges could predict a subject's Q-sort on 100 Murray needs or a pic­
ture preference sort task equally well if based upon direct interview­
ing, observing an interview, hearing the interview, or just reading
the interview. It may be that Luft's projective test tapped deeper 
levels of the subject's personality than that which was reached by 
the sorting tasks described above. Results for the more objective 
tasks were highly consistent, and have been replicated by Giedt (1955) 
with sound film interviews, by Sperber and Alderstein who compared
(1961) taped versus transcribed interviews for IQ estimates, and 
Tomlinson (1967) who investigated direct versus indirect interviews 
(seen through a two-way mirror).
It appeared that interview data was generally useful regard­
less of method of acquisition. Only Grigg (I960) discovered a
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condition to be assiduously avoided. Actual taped, re-enacted, and 
transcribed interview materials were compared as sources for predic­
tions about a subject's responses to the Adjective Check List and Self 
Q-Sort tasks. The re-enacted interview was the least valid source of 
data and resulted in the lowest rates of accuracy. Most clinicians 
rarely encounter simulated interviews, but this is a variable operant 
in Psychodrama and many experimental conditions, and has to be taken 
into consideration when results are interpreted.
Type: Psychometric
Researchers have produced evidence indicating that the bulk 
of judgmental accuracy can be attributed to BID or case data should 
serve as an alarm for the conscientious clinician and must motivate 
him to evaluate and analyze the empirical contributions of test proce­
dures. We have some knowledge about how our most frequently used 
instruments are related to predictive accuracy.
The Rorschach Test was inferior as a predictor when compared 
with other well known test procedures in studies conducted by Kelly 
and Fiske (1951), Kostlan, (1954), Soskin (1959), Little and 
Shneidman (1959), Sines (1959), and Howard (1962). Kostlan (1954) 
not only found that the Rorschach was least valid when compared to 
the MMPI, BID or case history, but he and Soskin (1954, 1959) reported 
that judges emphasized maladjustment and changed previously accurate 
predictions when Rorschach data was introduced. These are serious 
indictments when it is considered that the Rorschach Test is the most 
used test technique in mental health facilities throughout the nation
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(Sundberg, 1961). Wildman and Wildman (1967) reported that clini­
cians relied upon it more than any other test when time was limited 
and a concise battery was indicated. The MMPI has given statistically 
more valid results, but it too falls short of being more serviceable 
than BID (Kostlan, 1954; Sines, 1954; Little and Shneidman, 1955).
These results taken on face value have been misleading, and 
they must be examined closely before they can be understood and 
validly interpreted. Practically all of these investigations were 
equally fallible in that the judge was usually forced to utilize 
Rorschach and other data in an unusual, unfamiliar, inappropriate 
manner. McArthur (1955) and Holt (1958) both warned that the clini­
cian will never do well if he is not allowed to use a familiar instru­
ment in a preferred manner and yet Kostlan (1954) required anticipation 
of patient responses to a true and false task, both activities being 
foreign to the clinician. Howard (1962) required rating of 10 little 
used Murray Needs, although Borke and Fiske (1957) showed that a lack 
of familiarity with a task significantly effected results. By con­
trast, the Rorschach is often used to estimate IQ in practice, and 
judges asked to perform this familiar task have been observed to be 
quite successful according to Todd (1954), Bialik and Hamlin (1954) 
and Grebstein (1963).
Inaccuracy may also be due to the fact that the Rorschach Test 
may best tap the pathological or deepest, less ego-organized aspects 
of personality (Stone and Dellis, 1960). Soskin (1954) reported that 
the Rorschach was highly successful in detecting negative traits
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overlooked during interviews, which were more productive in isolating 
positive traits. It seems more and more likely low levels of agree­
ment between the Rorschach and other tests may be due to the fact that 
our instruments do indeed tap different elements during personality 
assessment and inter-test reliability should therefore not be highly 
probable. Little and Shneidman (1955) were disappointed to find low 
reliability in inter-test judgments, but recently it was shown that 
they may have missed meaningful results by not evaluating how well 
judges agreed on specific traits on an intra-test basis. Goldberg 
and Werts (1966) had judges rate four traits from four different 
sources of data, vocational history, Rorschach Test, MMPI and the WAIS. 
They also found little inter-test agreement, but did find reliability 
on an intra-test basis.
Discovery of low reliability may reflect the fact that our 
tests do not overlap, rather than a lack of dependability. Poor ex­
perimental design is another influential factor that oftentimes con­
taminates results and masks any validity the Rorschach can demonstrate. 
As an example, lack of control for position effect is blatant in a 
number of studies. Howard (1962) claimed the Rorschach was the least 
useful rating device when compared to the Stein Sentence Completion 
Test and the TAT, but he never considered the significance of requir­
ing judgments with the Rorschach when it had always been preceded by 
the total battery. Winch and More (1956) committed the same position 
error in reference to the TAT and invalidly concluded it contributed 
no additional information or increase in predictive validity.
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Lastly, Hamlin pointed out the Rorschach made a poor showing 
in many investigations because it cannot be utilized to predict global 
measures from atomistic data and this shortcoming as practiced re­
sulted inevitably in unreliable and invalid performances (Cummings, 
1954). If research is designed to demonstrate the true utility of 
the Rorschach Test in the clinical process, the results cannot be 
valid unless measures are taken to insure that the dependent variable 
is truly a clinically appropriate task, is familiar, and is complex 
enough to allow for the expression of qualitative differences. Judges 
utilized must be clinicians, and the experimental design must be highly 
controlled to eliminate contaminating factors that confound results.
Output Data; The Q-sort
Stephenson (1953), Meehl (1960) and Bieri (1966) all advocated 
the Q-sort method as an ideal output or dependent variable for projec­
tive test and personality research. It allows a highly qualitative 
assessment of individual personality on a quantitative, ipsative basis 
that is conducive to powerful parametric statistical analysis (Meehl, 
1959b).
Q-technique is simple, making it an ideal instrument to use 
with a variety of populations, including the layman. A subject is 
asked to arrange (sort) a group of descriptive statements (a deck) to 
describe events, entities or objects. Cards containing the items are 
usually arranged along a continuum ranging from "most like" or "least 
like," and therefore the technique is nothing more than a sophisti­
cated rank-order procedure. Q-items or descriptive statements may
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consist of theoretical statements or personality traits, and they are 
selected as being directly related to whatever the investigator is 
studying. Stephenson pioneered the method (Kerlinger, 1964), and 
demonstrated it very well in an evaluation of Jungian theory 
(Stephenson, 1953). Butler and Haigh (1954) used personality traits 
in examining possible changes in self-concept, but Q-decks have been 
constructed to study a variety phenomena including attitude toward 
work (Neff, 1963), types of stereotypes (Beck, 1954; Rubin and Shontz, 
1960), family concepts (Van der Veen, 1965), personality profiles 
(Block, 1961), and a deck devoted to the study of development is cur­
rently being devised (Block, 1961).
In selecting items Goodling and Guthrie (1956) suggested that 
items should be chosen that give neither strong negative nor positive 
responses consistently across different sorts. This is especially 
important to control for, when people are asked to describe themselves 
(self-sorts), since Edwards (1953, 1955) discovered that such Q-sorts 
are correlated .84 and .87 for males and females respectively to 
profiles arranged on a basis of social desirability. Moreover, items 
should result in high inter-sorter variability to insure greater dis­
criminant power and low intra-sorter variability to insure reliable 
results (Goodling and Guthrie, 1956). Harris (1960) has expressed 
misgivings about using Q-techniques and indicated that one does not 
know if he has selected an adequate or a valid collection of statements. 
While this is a hurdle, it is not insurmountable, since the adequacy of 
a deck can be established by the process of continual alteration and
36
progressive refinement until it attains a recognized descriptive ex­
cellence. Number of cards in a deck is selected for convenience, 
statistical demands, and in order to establish stability and relia­
bility (Kerlinger, 1964). Decks usually consist of not less than 60 
items, may include as many as 140 items, but in most instances do not 
exceed 100 items.
Distributions of Q-decks are an arbitrary matter, but a pre­
scribed or forced distribution resulting in a quasi-normal arrange­
ment is usually preferred because of its distinct statistical 
advantages, allowing parametric manipulation (Block, 1961; Kerlinger, 
1964). Free distributions allow for the expression of biases that 
render means and variances highly disparate and rule out the possibil­
ity of direct comparisons of two different sorts. Forced distribu­
tions have the same mean and variance, allow for direct comparisons, 
produce as much information as free distributions, and lastly allow 
greater discrimination (Block, 1961). Livson and Nichols (1957) sug­
gested a rectangular forced sort as productive of the most discrimi­
nations possible, but Block (1956) has shown that a normal 9 point 
distribution with 100 items allowed almost as many discriminations as 
a 9 point rectangular distribution with the same number of items.
The most suitable Q-deck for personality assessment is prob­
ably the California Q-deck constructed by Block (1961). This 100 
item deck represents 10 years of refinement, and is the third form of 
the items, that have been selected from psychological and psychiatric 
reports, specifically for the purpose of describing personality. It
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employs basic language that is theoretically neutral, suggests con­
tinuums and minimizes dichotomies that are unproductive, is generally 
not judgmental in tone, and involves as few double meanings as 
possible. The CQ-deck is arranged in a 5:8;12:16;18:16:12:8:5 forced 
distribution of nine rating levels to approximate a normal curve and 
has been used for research projects since 1961. Van Atta (1966) 
employed it recently as a dependent measure to assess the efficacy of 
various personality conceptualizations based on transcribed interview 
dialogue. In general, researchers have found the deck useful, 
reliable and heuristic.
Summary and Critique
The preceding discussions demonstrated that the current state 
of affairs in clinical judgment and prediction is far from being ideal. 
The clinician is now beginning to exceed the accuracy of actuarial 
prediction (Lindzey, 1965; Imig, 1967), but this has seldom occurred.
In any case, clinical and actuarial accuracy almost never exceeded a 
hit rate of 60 to 707o, and much needs to be done if we are to raise 
our level of clinical efficiency to a higher status that is more 
acceptable.
Typically, clinicians reject mechanical procedures, probably 
irrationally, because of a fear of being made obsolete or perhaps 
being replaced by an automated process. Machines will always require 
human direction, but can provide us with helpful clinical data, and 
they can free the clinician from routine chores to do more complex 
and demanding jobs (Meehr, 1954a; Rotter, 1967). The clinician who
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works independently of actuarial data proceeds in a linear, additive 
fashion much like a regression equation anyway, but he reduces his 
efficiency to that of a second rate computer because he employes un­
tested, unverified subjective probabilities to evaluate incoming data 
(Grebstein, 1963). Many times he is inaccurate only because he is 
emphasizing the wrong, unrelated predictor variables (Oskamp, 1965; 
Watley, 1966a). Because of these facts we should do actuarial 
analyses where possible, to discover important factors to be stressed 
for accurate prediction. After pertinent predictors have been iso­
lated they can be used as a springboard and clinical skills may be 
utilized to determine unique factors in the case, not covered by a 
stereotype or a general base rate formulation.
Tests should probably not be used to determine how a patient 
is similar to the others in a general group, but will be more bene­
ficial in the long run, if they are used to isolate unique, differ­
ential, but reliable patient characteristics. The current literature 
would seem to indicate that tests have contributed very little to our 
predictive accuracy, but much of the results cannot be embraced in its 
entirety. There is a great need to know why our tests fail, and what 
utility they do have in the current clinical practice. Sechrest 
(1963) pointed out, "It seems clear that validity must be claimed 
for a test in terms of some increment in predictive efficiency over 
the information otherwise easily and cheaply available." Since 
greater amounts of data do not necessarily lead to higher levels of 
predictive accuracy, relevant tests must be selected that do make a 
worthwhile contribution.
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The Rorschach Test, of all our instruments, would seem to 
possess the greatest need for study, since it should have greater con­
current and incremental validity, and is the most frequently used 
test. If too many tests can in fact reduce accuracy and create con­
fusing redundancies, it is equally possible that there is an optimal 
degree of data collection for any single technique or test. It may 
be possible to learn how techniques may be best employed for predic­
tion, by assessment of the incremental validity of any segment or 
procedure employed within a single test like the Rorschach.
At the present time a complete administration of the Rorschach 
consists of the initial card presentation (Free association), an 
inquiry concerning the free association, a procedure to test the 
limits of perception, scoring of responses by a formal method and 
lastly, report writing. Odum (1950) conducted a survey and reported 
that the average time taken for the entire procedure involves four 
hours of work. If any of the above procedures or steps are unproduc­
tive it would be useful to eliminate them since the busy clinician 
in practice has a shortage of time.
Despite cost in time and money, in research questioning the 
validity of the Rorschach, only one investigator has attempted to 
find out.how much each part of the test contributes to final predic­
tive accuracy. Unfortunately, like many other Rorschach studies so 
many variables were confounded that the results are not easy to inter­
pret and have only limited use.
Turner (1966) attempted to determine the optimal amount of
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Rorschach protocol information essential to personality descriptions 
for judges at various levels of professional experience. One hundred 
judges were used; 25 undergraduate psychology majors, 25 graduate 
students in clinical psychology, 25 Ph.D.'s recently graduated with 
less than 5 years experience, and 25 Fellows of the Society of Projec­
tive Techniques. Complete Rorschach protocols were obtained from five 
psychiatric inpatients and were divided among the 100 judges so that 
each case was seen by 5 judges from each experience level.
Experimental procedure employed a repeated measures design 
and each protocol was presented sequentially to the same judge in the 
form of four consecutive booklets representing increasing amounts of 
protocol data. One hundred fifty true and false items on personality 
were selected from the Little and Shneidman study of 1959 for use as 
the dependent variable, and criterion responses to the items were 
obtained from a variety of ward personnel familiar with the patient. 
Number of sufficiently agreed upon items varied amongst the protocols 
from 58 to 76 items, and consequently the results from the different 
protocols could not be compared directly.
The four different amounts of protocol information were: 1.
Free Association, 2. Free Association plus location chart, 3, Free 
Association and location chart plus Inquiry including the Testing of 
the Limits, and 4. an entire scored protocol including the Free 
Association, location chart, and Inquiry, plus psychogram and quanti­
tative scores contained in the Klopfer and Davidson Individual 
Record Blank. A single judge was asked to read level one information
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and answer the true and false questions, then was asked to go on to 
information level two and answer the same true and false questions, go 
on to level three etc.
Results indicated no significant increases at the .05 level in 
the number of statements answered correctly as protocol information 
increased. In addition, both the Fellows and the Ph.D. 's exceeded the 
graduate students, but neither group exceeded the undergraduates.
Results were not surprising and might be attributed to the 
experimental design just as well as to the experimental variables of 
amount of data and level of professional experience. First, effects 
that differing amounts of data could have had were masked and con­
founded by using the same judges and producing a set or training 
effect. It is already known that clinicians tend to make hasty con­
clusions on minimal data, and it could not be expected that they would 
use additional data if they were forced into a rigid set by requiring 
early, full blown personality conceptualizations. Secondly, even if 
the information increments were not subject to confounding, the sample 
was a narrow one, and involved only psychiatric inpatients, and this 
could have contributed to the superfluousness of added amounts of 
data. Watkins and Stauffacher (1952) showed that only the content of 
speech in Rorschach protocols was necessary to identify schizophrenics. 
Turner (1963) therefore, could have expected the evaluation of his 
population with just the first and minimal level of information.
There was no reason for judges to use any additional information 
because of the type of subject that was to be judged. The use of a
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constricted sample reduces the generalizability of the results and 
further invalidates the sweeping conclusions that were drawn.
Moreover, failure to obtain significant judging differentials 
between levels of experience was probably due to the use of a gross, 
dichotomous dependent variable that allowed no qualitative differences 
to emerge. True and false questions may have been appropriate for 
undergraduates with limited skills, but they are not capable of accom­
modating the advanced, trained judge who uses highly qualified judg­
ments and predictions. Effects of assumed similarity (Taft, 1955) 
were not controlled for either and favored the younger inexperienced 
judges since patients (with exception of one) were in their twenties 
(Turner, 1964). Lastly, Turner made no provisions during the experi­
ment, for determining how much judgmental accuracy was due to Rorschach 
data or BID, and Gage and Cronbach (1955) cautioned that any measure 
of accuracy is meaningless unless it is analyzed for true differential 
and for stereotyping accuracy. The latter must be partialled out of 
the results if a true measure of accuracy is to be derived. A post hoc 
attempt was made to eliminate the effect of stereotyping, by eliminat­
ing those questions answered in identical directions for the entire 
protocol sample. This technique may have rendered the results ambigu­
ous because one could then not tell if the eliminated items were super­
ficial and stereotyped, or if they on the other hand did really 
represent relevant and therefore true differential observations. 
Therefore, an incremental analysis of various Rorschach procedures is 
still needed and Turner should be congratulated for making the first 
efforts, although inadequate.
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Statement of the Problem
The major purpose of the present study is to determine the 
optimal amount of Rorschach protocol data required for maximal accur­
acy in personality assessment when experience level of judges and 
degree of pathology of the subjects are taken into account. The first 
analysis, proceeding by examining the accuracy of each personality 
assessment, will yield a measure of an incremental and predictive 
validity of the various Rorschach procedures.
Another purpose of the study will be to determine what amounts 
of Rorschach data are required for true differential accuracy in per­
sonality assessment when experience and pathology are controlled. In 
this section of the study predictions based upon Rorschach data will 
be compared for accuracy with predictions based only upon minimal 
identifying data, and this will yield a measure of incremental and pra-... 
dictive validity for different types of data sources being compared.
The following hypotheses will be tested:
1. Accuracy of prediction is highly related to amount of 
Rorschach data available.
2. Less experienced judges will require greater amounts of 
data to reach levels of accuracy attained by the more 
experienced judges.
3. More Rorschach data will be required to assess less dis­
turbed subjects accurately.
4. Levels of accuracy for the more disturbed subjects will 
be higher than the accuracy levels attained with less 
disturbed subjects.
5. Inexperienced judges will be more accurate with the more 
disturbed subjects.
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6 . There will be a positive relationship between experience 
and accuracy,
7. There will be a positive relationship between amount of 
data, level of experience and degree of pathology in 
regard to accuracy.
8 . Rorschach data will raise the level of accuracy signifi­
cantly above that attained on the basis of only BID.
9. More experienced judges will be more accurate than less 
trained judges with only BID.
10. BID alone will result in more accuracy with more dis­
turbed patients.
11. More Rorschach data will be needed by inexperienced 
judges to exceed accuracy attained on the basis of BID 
alone when used by experienced judges.
12. There will be a negative or inverse relationship between 
confidence and accuracy.
13. There will be a positive relationship between amount of 
data and level of confidence.
14. There will be an inverse relationship between experi­




One hundred forty-four judges representing four different 
levels of psychological training and experience were asked to complete 
California Q-sorts (Appendix B) based upon varying amounts of clinical 
data consisting of minimal identifying and Rorschach protocol data. 
Accuracy of personality assessment and prediction in the Q-sort was 
determined by comparing experimental CQ-sorts with criterion CQ-sorts 
completed by persons well acquainted with subjects of the identifying 
data and Rorschach protocols. Judges were asked to indicate the 
level of confidence that they had in the correctness of their assess­
ments, and also completed a' biographical data sheet.
Judges
Judges were selected closely in accordance with training and 
experience levels outlined by Turner (1964) to make results as com­
parable as possible. The experience levels were:
Group I: 36 untrained undergraduates who were then complet­
ting an introductory course in psychology.
Group II: 36 undergraduate psychology majors and would have 
completed an average of 32 hours of psychology.
Group 111:36 graduate clinical psychology students who had 
at least one course in the Rorschach technique, 
but had not completed an internship and had not 
had extended experience with the inkblots. They 
had administered an average of 11 Rorschach tests.
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Group IV: 36 Ph.D.'s who had had prolonged and practical 
experience with the Rorschach test, and had 
indicated a special interest in Rorschach tech­
nique, either directly as a member or Fellow of 
the Society of Projective Techniques, or by 
Biographical material within the APA directory.
At the time of the experiment they had admin­
istered an average of 1,211 Rorschach tests.
The judges were selected from the LSU and University of 
Alabama campuses where possible, and additional judges were selected 
from the APA and the Society of Projective Techniques directories, 
and were contacted via the mails.
Subjects
Rorschach protocols were obtained from six subjects repre­
senting three broad degrees of mental health, Normal, Neurotic, and 
Psychotic conditions (designated No, Nu, and Po in this study).
Normals were defined as those persons who were currently functioning 
and achieving reasonably well within the community, and never re­
ceived psychological or psychiatric treatment. Their MMPI's resulted 
in no T scores over 70. They were selected from Baton Rouge,
Louisiana and environs. For the purpose of this study, Neurotics 
were defined as those persons who functioned with the aid of treat­
ment of a psychological/psychiatric nature, but had never been hospi­
talized for mental reasons. Their MMPI's showed T scores greater 
than 70 within the first five, but not within the last five scales. 
They were recruited from mental health centers within the Baton Rouge 
area. For the purpose of this study, Psychotics were defined as those 
subjects who were unable to subsist within the community at large, and
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were residents of one of the Louisiana state institutions for the 
mentally ill, MMPI's obtained from them showed T scores greater 
than 70 in the last 5 scales. No subject was selected who had a 
history of any form of organic illness.
All subjects were selected to represent a wide range of age 
levels (age 20 to 66, mean age 36,6), and sex was controlled by 
selecting 3 males and 3 females. Appendix C gives the biographical 
details for each of the six cases. (The actual Rorschach and MMPI 
records are on deposit with the American Documentation Institute.)
Criterion Judges
CQ-sorts were obtained from either three or four acquaintances 
of each subject, who had known the subject for a period not less than 
six months. They consisted of therapists, nurses, social workers, 
attendants, colleagues, co-workers and fellow students. The specific 
number and types of judges used with each case are also given in 
Appendix C.
Input Data
Six different amounts of data were compared. They were 
selected on a basis of relevance, and were included if in fact a prac­
ticing clinician could conceivably utilize such a data source or com­
bination for the purpose of making a personality assessment. They were 
as follows:
1. Basic Identifying Data (BID); age, sex, level of education, 
marital status, treatment status, and occupation.
2. BID plus Free Association (FA) and location sheet (Loc).
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3. BID, FA, Loc and scoring (Sc) based on just the FA.
4. BID, FA, Loc and inquiry (Inq).
5. BID, FA, Loc, Inq and scoring (Scor) based on FA and Inq.
6 . BID, FA, Loc, Inq, Scor and the Testing of the Limits
(TTL).
Each judge received a packet containing all of the available 
information for a given experimental condition, for total considera­
tion. The packet also contained a deck of CQ-items, an instruction 
sheet on its use, and a matrix on which to record the final selected 
Q-sort, A biographical data sheet was also completed (see Appendix 
D).
Output Data
The dependent variable, the GQ-sort was selected because it is 
a simple task allowing for precise qualitative personality assessments 
in simple, unconfusing language. The latter eliminated language as a 
factor which could have prevented comparison of performances by judges 
who use differing theoretical orientations. The forced, normal dis­
tribution of the CQ-allowed for extensive parametric statistical 
analysis.
In order to facilitate post hoc analysis of the results, the 
CQ-deck was subjected to an analysis along three dimensions, before 
it was employed (see Appendix B). First, 10 judges, not used in the 
experiment proper, were asked to rate each of the 100 CQ-items along 
a continuum of Social Desirability. The resulting ranks were averaged 
and provided the foundation for a scale on Social Desirability in 
reference to the California Q-sort,
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Secondly, another group of five judges, also not used in the 
experiment proper, provided judgments that determined whether an item 
could be considered a phenotypic or a genotypic statement. Lastly, 
six judges evaluated the 100 items and determined whether an item 
could be considered indicative of one of four types of statements:
1. trait, 2, dynamic process, 3. interpersonal behavior, or, 4. 
descriptive, overt behavior not necessarily interpersonal. Results 
of these three different types of ranking, and the directions used to 
obtain them may be seen in Appendix B.
Product moment correlations were obtained by comparing Q-sorts 
of experimental judges with consensual Q-sorts derived from rankings 
of criterion judges on each case. Computations were completed in
o nNVg, where d£p is the 
squared difference between the Q-values of corresponding items, N is 
the number of items in the Q-set and is the standard deviation of 
the Q-set.
Confidence
Confidence in judgment was measured by asking each judge to
express the total number of CQ-items he believed he had accurately
placed into all of the Q-categories. Since there were 100 items,
the judges were in effect providing a quantitative expression through
exact percentages which also allow for extensive statistical analysis
(Adams, 1957). The second expression of confidence was qualitative 
and required the judge to indicate how he felt about his performance 
and judgments. A five point scale was provided for this purpose, with
accordance with the formula; r = 1 -^d?ip
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5 corresponding with Very Well, 3 corresponding with Fair, and 1 
corresponding with Very Poorly.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Coefficients of correlation obtained by each experimental 
judge are given in Appendix A. They were treated as ordinary scores 
(Block, 1961), indicative of judgmental accuracy, and provided the 
basis for an analysis of variance (ANOV) on accuracy for the three 
major factors of pathology, experience and information. Mean corre­
lation coefficients for main effects have been incorporated into 
tables for the mean correlations of all possible double interactions 
and are given-in Tables 1, 2 and 3, Results of the ANOV on accuracy 
are given in Table 4,
TABLE 1
MEAN CORRELATIONS FOR PATHOLOGY X EXPERIENCE FACTORS
I II III IV X
No .18 .13 .11 .00 .10
Nu .16 .15 .10 .11 .13
Po .24 .30 .28 .23 .26
X .19 .19 .16 .11
KEY: No - Normal I - Untrained Undergraduates
Nu - Neurotic II - Undergraduate Psych Majors





MEAN CORRELATIONS FOR PATHOLOGY X INFORMATION FACTORS
1 2 3 4 5 6 X
No .36 .09 .22 .02 .04 -.10 .10
Nu .25 .08 .16 .10 .18 .02 .13
Po .28 .32 .19 .26 .25 .27 .26
X .30 .17 .20 .13 .16 .06
KEY: 1-6 :Incremental Information levels.
TABLE 3
MEAN CORRELATIONS FOR EXPERIENCE X INFORMATION FACTORS
1 2 3 4 5 6 X
I .29 .26 .20 .22 .09 .11 .19
II .38 .25 .28 .11 .11 .03 .19
III .31 .16 .19 .11 .22 .05 .16
IV .23 .04 .11 .07 .21 .04 .11
X .30 .17 .20 .13 .16 .06
An inspection of Table 4 below reveals that the F ratio of
5.580 obtained for the main effect of pathology was significant at the 
.01 level of significance. The main effect for the information factor 
yielded an F ratio of 2.410, which was significant at the .05 level.
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The main effect for the factor of experience did not reach a signifi­
cant level, but it was distinctly influential in performances and 
will be discussed below. None of the interactions reached significant 
levels,
TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON ACCURACY
Source DF MS F
A (Pathology) 2 .343 5.580**
B (Information) 5 .148 2.410*
G (Experience) 3 .048
A X B 10 .072
B X C 15 .025
A X C 6 .019
A X B X C 30 .034
Sampling Error 72 .061 V
TOTAL 143
** Probability less than .01 
* Probability less than .05
Pathology and Accuracy
In order to pinpoint the exact experimental conditions that con­
tributed to significance on the pathology factor, Duncan Multiple Range 
Tests (DMRTs) were computed on the basis of the means of the pathology 
factor, and the means of both interactions with information and
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experience. These range tests are given in Tables 5, 6 and 7 imme­
diately below.
TABLE 5







MEANS .109 .133 .266
A No .109 .024 .157**
B Nu .133 . 133*
C Po .266
SHORTEST SIGNIFICANT RANGES
** Significant at a .05 Level * Significant at a
probability of probability of
less than . o r r2 - -.101 less than .05
R3 - .107 
.01 Leve1 
R2 - .135 
r3 - .154
TABLE 6
DUNCAN MULTIPLE RANGE TEST APPLIED TO THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
PATHOLOGY & INFORMATION
A B— --M N 0 P Q R
Pathology No Nu Po Po Po Po Po No
Information Level 6 6 5 4 6 1 2 1
-.108 .022 .251 .262 .278 .286 .327 .367
A -.108 .359 .371* .387* .394* .436* .476*
B .022
SHORTEST SIGNIFICANT RANGES 
.05 Level
NOTE: The insignific- R13 - .366 R2g - .370 *Indicates significance
ant ranges bet. R ^4 - .367 R ]7 - .371 at a probability less
B and M not given R-^ - .369 R2g “ .372 than .05
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TABLE 7
DUNCAN MULTIPLE RANGE TEST APPLIED TO THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
PATHOLOGY AND EXPERIENCE
A B-----H I J K L
Experience Level IV III I IV I III II
Pathology Level No Nu No Po Po Po Po
MEANS .004 .108 .182 .238 .246 .280 .300
A .004 .178 .234* .242* .275* .296*
B .108







* Indicates Significance 
at the .05 Level
NOTE: The insignificant
ranges between 
means B and H are 
not given above.
Table 5 shows that two of the experimental conditions achieved 
significant levels. Protocols obtained from psychotic patients could 
be judged more accurately than those for the normal subjects at the 
.01 level of significance, and they could be differentiated from 
neurotic protocols at a .05 level of significance. Despite the fact 
that records from normals could not be significantly differentiated 
from those of neurotics, an examination of the means in Table 1 shows 
that as accuracy increases pathology of the subject also increases, 
since means for Normals, Neurotics, and' Psychotics were respectively 
.10, .13, and .26.
Although the interactions, as previously mentioned, did not 
reach significant levels, examination of mean correlations on the
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interactions are revealing regarding the influence that experience 
and information can have when judging records of patients manifesting 
different degrees of pathology. Mean correlations for the pathology 
factor in Table 1 show a perfect inverse relationship between train­
ing and assessment of Normal records, and an almost perfect inverse 
relationship in the assessment of Neurotic records, and finally in the 
case of protocols from Psychotics the undergraduate psychology majors 
achieved the best performance while the Ph.D.'s attained the worst 
performance.
The role that the information factor plays in reference to the 
factor of pathology can be perceived by referring to Table 2. The 
greatest accuracy for the Normal and Neurotic records was attained by 
using just BID. More information was needed in assessing psychotic 
records, but not a great deal more, since the best performance was 
achieved by just adding the FA material. This means that psychotic 
records were most accurately judged by the lesser trained individuals 
using a minimum of information.
Amount of ‘Information and Accuracy
As cited above, the results of the ANOV (Table 4) show that 
the main effect of Information was significant at the .05 level of 
significance. DMRTS for the Information main effect means are given 
in Table 8 below. Here it can be seen that two experimental condi­
tions attained significance. Those judges utilizing BID alone were 
significantly more accurate (at the .05 level) than judges utilizing 
BID, FA and Inquiry (Information Level 4). More surprising, it was
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found that judges using just BID were significantly more accurate 
(.01 level of significance) than judges having the benefit of using 
all available data or information.
TABLE 8



















A .064 .065 .095 .105 .131 .237** .05 Level
B .129 .030 .040 .066 .172* R2-.142 R2-.189 
R3-.150 R3 -.I98
C .159 .010 .036 .142 R4-.155 R4-.203 
R5-.158 R5-.207
D .169 .026 .132 Rg-.161 Rg-.210
E .195 .106
** Indicates significance at a probability of less than .01
* Indicates significance at a probability of less than .05
Since the intervening Information Level 5 was not significantly 
poorer than BID, and both adjacent levels were poorer, it can only be 
concluded that scoring based upon inquiry makes a significant contribu­
tion to accuracy, because that was the only difference between levels 
4 and 5. If scoring based on Inquiry in Information Level 5 is a sig­
nificant increment, then it might also be concluded that it was the 
scoring in Level 3 Information (BID, FA, and scoring based on FA) that 
might have contributed a significant input since Information Level 3 
was also not poorer than BID. However, the increased accuracy in
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Information Level 3 may have been attained due to the omission of 
Inquiry. This is supported by noting the differential accuracy levels 
of conditions 2 and 4. Information level 2 is identical to level 4 
except that the latter also included the Inquiry as part of its total 
input. Means in Table 3 show that accuracy was higher when Inquiry 
was omitted and FA was used in isolation. Figure One graphs all mean 
correlation coefficients for the Information main effect. It can 
readily be seen that BID alone exceeded all of the Rorschach condi­
tions. A linear function has been projected through the Rorschach 
conditions, and a perfect negative trend is described when levels 2 ,
4 and 6 are considered. Levels 3 and 5 deviate from this pattern and 
it should be remembered that these were the conditions that included 
scoring. The failure of level 4 to approximate BID levels of accuracy 
shows that an increment of additional verbal input can produce a de­
bilitating redundancy or factor of interference. The lack of additional 
verbal information in level 3 may have been significant in allowing the 
quantitative data to express a greater influence and render this experi­
mental condition the most accurate Rorschach level. Moreover, the 
relationship between data amounts and different degrees of pathology 
has already been noted above (Table 2).
It should be pointed out here that BID alone was not greatest 
in accuracy with the most pathological records, but was most beneficial 
with the less disturbed or normal and neurotic subjects. In general 
the addition of information tended to reduce accuracies for normal and 
neurotic subjects, but the mean for the first three levels of informa­
tion in the psychotic condition is almost identical to the mean of the
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last three data levels (.263 and .260 respectively). Rorschach data 
provided an increment to BID only when dealing with psychotics. The 
















MEAN ACCURACY FOR THE INFORMATION FACTOR
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Level of Training and Accuracy
When experience was considered as a main effect in the ANOV 
(Table 4), it did not reach significant levels of accuracy. This does 
not mean that experience had no effect upon performance. Means in 
Tables 1 and 3 show an almost perfect negative relationship exists 
between accuracy and experience. Results for untrained, trained 
undergraduates, graduates and Ph.D.'s were ,19, .19, .16, and .11 
respectively. DMRTs were performed on these means and also the means 
for the double interactions involving experience. There were no sig­
nificant ranges and thus no tables will be presented on those computa­
tions, except for the interaction between experience and level of 
pathology (Table 7). Here it was discovered that all experience groups 
judging protocols from psychotics were significantly more accurate 
than the most experienced group judging normals, so that Pathology 
rather than Experience must have been the influential factor in that 
double interaction. In reference to the accuracy of the performances 
on the psychotic records, it can be seen that the undergraduate psy­
chology majors were the most accurate group, while once again the 
Ph.D.'s were the least accurate.
In order to determine more fully the causes of the differen­
tial performances of the four experience groups, a post hoc analyses 
of the large judgmental errors on each individual's Q-sort was com­
pleted, group by group. A miss or an error was recorded for a group 
if ten or more judges in a given group deviated from a criterion rat­
ing for the item, by four or more ranks. The total number of recorded
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misses for each experimental group is given in Appendix A. It can 
be seen that more training seems to lead to more total errors, since 
Ph.D.'s and graduates made the most errors, psychology majors less, 
and finally untrained undergraduates made the smallest number of 
errors. It is interesting to note the graduate students made as many 
errors as the Ph.D.'s and yet attained a higher level of accuracy.
This can only mean that the errors were not of the same magnitude and 
Ph.D.'s appeared to be extreme when making judgments.
To determine the types of errors each group was making, the 
missed CQ-items were evaluated in accordance with the results of two 
different rating scales. Ranking for each item then were examined 
across the three pathology groups per each experience group to detect 
any trends in the use of any single item.
The first rating scale determined if a CQ-item was phenotypic 
or genotypic in content, and is listed in Appendix B, It was dis­
covered that the CQ-sort contains 46 phenotypic and 54 genotypic state­
ments, and as percentages would constitute a chance rate of error or 
expected rate of error for these two types of variables. Table 9 gives 
the actual percentages of error by level of training that were attained. 
Untrained undergraduates came closest to a chance rate of error.
Graduate students seemed to deviate the most from expected rates and 
seem to have had difficulty in assessing covert or underlying pro­
cesses of personality. Psychology majors had less difficulty in this 
area, and the Ph.D.'s even less.
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TABLE 9
ERRORS BY EXPERIENCE GROUPS FOR TWO RANKING SCALES
BY PERCENTAGES
PhDs Grads Majors Under- grads
Expected
Rates
Total Number Missed 25 25 20 17
Phenotypic Items 30 20 25 41 46
Genotypic Items 70 80 75 59 54
Trait Items 23 12 10 12 16
Descriptive Items 15 20 20 35 30
Dynamic Items 31 52 40 41 31
Interpersonal Items 31 16 30 12 23
The errors were further subjected to analysis, this time in 
accordance with a four factor rating scale to determine if the pheno­
typic mises involved descriptive or interpersonal statements, and if 
the genotypic misses involved dynamic processes or simple traits. The 
CQ-deck was found to contain 16% trait, 31%. dynamic, 23% interpersonal 
and 30%. descriptive statements. Once again these proportions were 
taken as chance rates of error. An inspection of Table 9 indicates 
that Ph.D.'s have no difficulty in assessing dynamic processes such as 
common defense mechanisms, but they do experience a loss of accuracy 
when utilizing the Rorschach to make predictions about traits or how a 
subject is apt to respond on an interpersonal basis. Graduate students 
on the other hand are able to assess simple traits such as talkative­
ness rather well, but do poorly when attempting to determine covert 
defense styles or mechanisms. The data also show that psychology 
majors tend to do better regarding dynamic processes, but they have
63
just about the same degree of difficulty in judging interpersonal 
behavior as the Ph.D.'s. Completely untrained undergraduates come the 
closest to expected rates of errors, but they too had difficulty with 
the judgments of dynamic processes.
These results show that greater training with the Rorschach 
does not necessarily lead to greater capacity to tap covert and unseen 
influences of the personality. An examination of Appendix C (which 
elucidates the items in the four most extreme CQ-sort categories in 
the consensual Q-sorts for each case) reveals that covert as well as 
overt processes were stressed, and judgmental inaccuracy could not be 
ascribed to criterion emphasis upon one type of item to the exclusion 
of the other.
Items 2, 33, 38, 39 and 73 (Appendix A) were the most inaccu­
rately assessed of all the CQ-items by all the judges regardless of 
training. In general, these and the other errors show that pathology 
was overstressed and the positive, healthy aspects of personality 
were either minimized or ignored by the judges. This trend was in­
creased as training increased and resulted in the Ph.D.'s performing 
poorest with the normal records and best with the psychotic records.
Level of Training and Confidence
Each judge in this investigation was asked to estimate his 
degree of confidence in his judgments three times. First a percentage 
was obtained (C-̂ ), then a 5 point scale (ranging from 5 for Very Well 
to 1 for Very Poorly) was used to express a subjective or qualitative 
confidence estimate,(C2 ). Finally, a judge was asked to re-consider
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his initial percentage after he was advised what effect his training 
might have had upon his initial estimate, i.e., minimal training leads 
to over-estimates, and extensive training leads to under-estimates of 
confidence (C3 ). An ANOV of Confidence on each of the three major 
factors, Pathology, Information, and Experience was completed for each 
of the three confidence expressions. No significant results were 
attained and thus the summary tables for the ANOVs will not be pre­
sented for inspection. However, Table 10 gives the means for C3 for 
the interaction between experience and information. The results for 
the same factors on C2 are presented in Table 11. An inspection of 
both of the tables shows that all of the judges felt that their per­
formance was Fair regardless of level of training or experience, but 
the quantitative expression of this feeling varied somewhat in an 
inverse manner. Even though psychology majors and Ph.D.'s felt they 
had done equally well, the less trained group expected to attain a much 
higher hit rate (12% more correct rankings). Neither quantitative nor 
qualitative expressions of confidence changed as a result of having 
added amounts of information, according to the means in these tables.
Means for experience groups I through IV on C3 were respectively 
42.47, 50.88, 44.19, and 47.02. These mean revised quantitative esti­
mates of confidence were compared with the original estimates (C^) to 
determine the direction and degree of altered confidence. A mean reduc­
tion of 8.89, 7.48, and 3.17 points were evidenced for groups I, II, 
and III, The Ph.D.'s increased their mean confidence estimate by 1.52 
points. These results reveal that there is an inverse relationship
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TABLE 10
MEANS FOR CONFIDENCE VARIABLE 1 FOR 
EXPERIENCE X INFORMATION FACTORS
1 2 3 4 5 6 X
I 63.66 66.50 41.33 41.84 44.50 50.33 51.36
II 59.66 56.83 61.16 63.83 65.83 42.83 58.36
III 39.16 _ 45.16 53.33 59.50 37.50 49.50 47.36
IV 41.66 45.00 60.66 44.33 33.33 48.00 45.50
X 51.04 53.37 54.12 52.37 45.29 47.66
TABLE 11
MEANS FOR CONFIDENCE VARIABLE 2 FOR
EXPERIENCE X INFORMATION FACTORS
1 2 3 4 5 6 X
I. 3.33 3.00 2 .66 2.50 2.83 3.00 2.88
II 3.00 3.33 2.83 3.66 3.16 2.83 3.13
III 3.16 3.00 3.33 3.16 2.83 3.16 3.11
IV 2.66 3.50 3.66 3.16 2.50 3.33 3.13
X 3.04 3.20 3.12 3.12 2.83 3.08
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between experience and a willingness to alter quantitative estimates 
of correctness or confidence, since less training allowed one to make 
a greater mean change in initial estimates. Ph.D.'s deviated the least 
from their original decisions on confidence. The direction of the 
changes and the sizes also show that the judges were appropriate in 
their feelings of their own level of expertise, since the less trained 
were more apt to agree that they had over-estimated and the more 
trained judges agreed they had under-estimated.
Level of Accuracy and Confidence
Performances of the judges were broken down into Lo, Med and Hi 
accuracy groups by ranking coefficients of correlation on each level 
of pathology, case by case, and dividing the continuum into equal 
thirds. The findings on confidence variables 1 and 2 for accuracy and 
level of pathology are given in Tables 12 and 13. Means of accuracy for 
confidence variable 1 for the Low, Medium and High Accurate groups were 
respectively, 53.51, 51.86, and 48.96. Thus there appears to be an 
inverse relationship between the quantitative expression of confidence 
and accuracy. Once again the relationship does not hold when a subjec­
tive or qualitative approximation (C2 ) is required. Means for each 
level of pathology for both expressions of confidence are congruent 
however, and judges felt they had done best with the Normal subjects 
and worst with the Neurotic subjects, on both a subjective and an ob­
jective basis.
Ranges and Cq means associated with each subjective category on 
the C2 variable are located in Table 14. It is interesting to note
TABLE 12
MEANS FOR CONFIDENCE VARIABLE 1 ON THE FACTORS OF ACCURACY AND PATHOLOGY
CASE 1 2 No 3 4 Nu 5 6 Po X
Lo 56.57 55.62 56.10 45.63 57.62 51.63 56.12 49.50 52.81 53.51
Med 59.28 53.75 56.51 51.88 39.12 45.50 39.63 67.50 53.57 51.86
Hi 55.12 62.12 58.62 47.50 40.75 44.13 39.50 48.75 44.13 48.96
X 56.99 57.16 57.07 48.33 45,83 47.08 45.08 55.25 50.16
TABLE 13
MEANS FOR CONFIDENCE VARIABLE 2 ON THE FACTORS OF ACCURACY AND PATHOLOGY
CASE 1 2 No 3 4 Nu 5 6 Po X
Lo 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.12 3.12 3.12 3.37 2.87 3.12 3.16
Med 2.87 3.12 3.00 3.12 2.50 2.81 3.00 3.25 3.12 2.97
Hi 3.62 2.87 3.25 2.62 2.75 2.68 2.75 3.62 3.18 3.04
X 3.24 3.08 3.16 2.95 2.79 2.89 3.04 3.24 3.14
CTiON
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that while the quantitative expression of confidence does generally 
increase as one begins to feel on a subjective basis that he has judged 
accurately, there is no assurance that the quantitative and qualitative 
expressions of confidence will be appropriate to each other. Ranges 
for all the C2 categories are basically so large that a judge can feel 
he has done very well while he has judged anywhere from 25% to 99% of 
the items correctly. Similarly, when a judge says he has performed 
poorly, he may have correctly identified from 5 to 50% of the itemsv 
This means that some of the judges who felt they did very poorly esti­
mated their level of accuracy to be greater than that of judges who had 
considered that they had done very well in their performances, and vice 
versa.
TABLE 14









Very Poorly (1 ) 3 5-50 33.75
Poorly (2 ) 18 5-80 34.57
Fair (3) 52 20-80 51.04
Well (4) 21 25-90 67.20
Very Well (5) 6 25-99 69.00
Criterion Measures
All of the foregoing results are meaningful only insomuch as the 
criterion Q-sorts on which they depend are accurate and are reliable
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measures of the personalities of protocol subjects. This would in 
turn depend upon inter-judge (criterion) agreement. Table 15 presents 
the mean correlation coefficients of all combinations of criterion 
judges per case. Agreement between judges for psychotic cases was 
lower than that attained by persons judging either normal or neurotic 
cases. An adaptation (Block, 1961) of the Spearman-Brown Prophecy 
Formula ( N(Average inter-judge correlation)/l - (N-l)(Average inter­
judge correlation) ) was applied to all cases to determine the degree 
to which disagreement on the personalities of the subjects was directly 
related to specific judges or if any other composites of judges would 
respond with a similar level of disparity. Spearman-Brown coefficients 
of reliability are also given in Table 15, and although the correlations 
for the psychotic cases were still lowest, the reliability level was 
reasonably high. The Spearman-Brown correlations for the four other 
cases were generally high and this means that additional groups of 
criterion judges would quite likely attain the same rate of agreement 
on other CQ-sorts for the same subjects. This also means that the
TABLE 15
INTER-JUDGE AGREEMENT, SPEARMAN-BROWN AND 
SOCIAL DESIRABILITY COEFFICIENTS
CASE 1 2 No 3 4 Nu 5 6 Po
Inter-judge 
Agreement .57 .41 .49 .40 .70 .55 .26 .20 .23
Spearman Brown .84 .68 .76 .73 .88 .81 .58 .50 .54
Social Desirability .78 .19 .48 .32 . 66 .49 .36 -.43 -.04
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original patient judgments and resulting CQ-sorts were representative 
and stable. Additional criterion stability was achieved by the addi­
tional measure of utilizing mean or consensual CQ-item values to form 
the ultimate consensual criterion CQ-sorts.
Two extreme positive and negative ranking categories for each 
case are to be found in Appendix C. An inspection of items reveals 
that there were specific CQ-items that were empirically associated 
with each case and level of pathology, to the exclusion of the remain­
ing levels of pathology, on the criterion CQ-sorts. As an example only 
Normal subjects were described by the criterion judges as being skepti­
cal (item 1) and calm (item 33), but not extrapunitive (item 23), con­
descending (item 27) or non-conforming (item 62). Only the Neurotic 
subjects were described as being uncomfortable with uncertainties and 
complexities (item 9) and not satisfied with the self (item 74). They 
did not have flattened affect (item 97) and were not able to handle 
anxiety and conflict by refusing to recognize their presence (item 8 6). 
Psychotics were characterized as being prone (extremely) to think and 
associate to ideas in unusual ways, have unusual thought processes 
(item 39), engage in personal fantasy and daydreams and also fictional 
speculations (item 46). They were positively described as persons one 
would not turn to for advice (item 29).
Social Desirability and Accuracy
Lastly, it has been suggested elsewhere that the Rorschach test 
can best assess undesirable traits (McGreevey, 1962), while acquaint­
ances of subjects can best assess desirable traits. The present results
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do not support such a contention. Consensual CQ-sorts of each case 
were correlated with a Social Desirability CQ-sort based upon the con­
sensual ranking of 10 raters (see Appendix B, for the consensual CQ-sort 
of Social Desirability, and Table 15 for the resulting coefficients of 
social desirability). Table 16 presents the rankings of each of the six 
cases used in this study, in terms of difficulty of assessment (accuracy) 
and relates these values to ranks arranged in terms of social desirabil­
ity for the same cases. Firstly, Table 15 reveals that social desirabil­
ity and mental health are not necessarily concommitant with each other, 
since the female psychotic Q-sort resulted in a Social Desirability 
coefficient of .36 and the normal male subject attained a Social Desira­
bility coefficient of .19 by contrast. Secondly, if the Rorschach test 
does tap undesirable characteristics, an inverse relationship should be 
expected. Accuracy of assessment should increase as the criterion 
CQ-sort increasingly assumes a socially undesirable profile. Inspection 
of Table 16 manifests a positive rather than a negative relationship be­
tween ease of assessment and social desirability.
TABLE 16
RANKINGS FOR CASES ON SOCIAL DESIRABILITY AND 
EASE OF ASSESSMENT
Case 1 2 3 4 5 6
Social Desirability 1 5 4 2 3 6




The results of this investigation show that accuracy with the 
Rorschach test increased as the degree of subject disturbance increased. 
Records from psychotic patients could be discriminated from those of 
normals or neurotics quite easily with a high degree of confidence and 
accuracy. These findings agree with those of Watkins and Stauffacher 
(1952), who found that records from psychotics could be identified 
significantly better than those from normals and neurotics on the 
Rorschach, when a rating scale for verbal deviance was used.
Information Amount and Accuracy
Six different, incremental conditions of information were used 
in this study to determine which Rorschach procedures were most pro­
ductive In personality assessment and judgmental accuracy. Generally, 
an increase in data resulted in a decrease of accuracy. Those informa­
tion conditions that included scoring deviated somewhat from this 
trend. Scoring based upon Free Association appeared to be more effec­
tive than scoring based upon the traditional combination of Free Asso­
ciation and Inquiry. That a modified scoring procedure can be effective 
has already been demonstrated by Gibby and Stotsky (1953). They found 
very little substantive difference in the production of important 
determinants in regard to the two different scoring conditions in
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question. Moreover, assessments made on the basis of information 
Level 3 (BID, FA and scoring based upon FA) were superior to all other 
assessments, including those made on the basis of Information Level 4 
(BID, FA and Inq). This means that an increase in verbal material may 
provide additional data, but it is redundant, overlapping and is not a 
source of additional information. Free Association plus scoring based 
upon it in all likelihood excels because it involves two different 
types of data that are not redundant and therefore provides more infor­
mation. Shapiro (1959) advocates that the Free Association and Scoring 
be used in combination because one tends to enhance the meaning of the 
other, and content brings greater meaning to determinants. Concerning 
the exclusive use of the FA/Sc combination, Odum (1950) showed that the 
elimination of the Inquiry and the Testing of the Limits results in an 
average of 45 minutes in time saved. This saving becomes even more sig­
nificant when it is kept in mind that a shortened Rorschach procedure 
will more importantly also result in a more accurate personality assess­
ment .
In some cases where a patient is notably disturbed, it can be 
profitable to make use of the Free Association by itself. Table 2 
shows that by far the best data source for the assessment of the psy­
chotics was the second information condition or just the Free Associa­
tion. This finding once again is consistent with the work of Watkins 
and Stauffacher (1952) who found that Rorschach verbalizations by 
themselves were sufficient for the accurate identification of psychotics. 
Moreover, this result also supports one of the major contentions of
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this study that Turner's judges (1964) required only the FA to attain 
their greatest levels of accuracy, because they were assessing only 
inpatients who were all severely ill, or required hospitalization. 
Caution should be taken before considering the general use of just FA, 
because greatest accuracies for Normals and Neurotics in the present 
study were attained when the FA/Sc combination was utilized. Turner 
(1964) could not make a contribution concerning this information condi­
tion, because he failed to consider the efficacy of such a source., or 
incorporate it into his study.
According to Odum (1950) reliance on just the Free Association 
material when used for testing purposes should yield an average of 1 
hour and 36 minutes in saved time, This certainly can be of consider­
able benefit to clinicians who are already overburdened in their profes­
sional responsibilities. Again it is even more significant to realize 
that a modified, shortened approach would result in greater accuracy 
with psychotics. Ironically, the total information condition, with 
maximal verbal and quantitative Rorschach data, including Testing of 
the Limits, consistently resulted in the poorest performances, at a 
level of significance with a probability less than .01.
Despite the fact that some Rorschach conditions were consis­
tently superior to others, it was the surprising finding of this 
investigation that the accuracy attained by using just BID was exceeded 
by Rorschach accuracy only once. This occurred with the exclusive use 
of FA with psychotics, which is itself, a condition of minimal informa­
tion. It was originally hypothesized that Rorschach accuracies would
74
exceed BID accuracies, but the results did not support this contention. 
Rather, the findings agree with other researches that have demonstrated 
the superiority of minimal data for accurate personality assessment
(Kelly and Fiske,1951; Soskin, 1954; Kostlan, 1954; Sines, 1959; Soskin,
?
1959). If minimal data can generate higher levels of accuracy it can 
do so probably because it stimulates the use of stable and appropriate 
stereotypes (Stelmachers and McHugh, 1964).
Performances in the current study support the notion that the 
Rorschach may be inaccurate because it causes one to over-estimate or 
stress negative findings and employ an inappropriate stereotype or per­
sonality model. Similar findings of Soskin (1959) with the Thematic 
Apperception Test indicate that this trend may be related to projective 
testing in general and not just to Rorschach technique. Patterns of 
missed CQ-items show that the judges refused to acknowledge ego strengths 
or positive characteristics of protocol subjects. It seemed as if the 
more trained judges had been set to be receptive to maladaptation, but 
have not learned how to recognize health on the Rorschach. The tendency 
for accuracy to increase as pathology increased is probably due to the 
fact that Rorschach generated, negative stereotypes became more -appro­
priate as deviance and pathology increased in reality.
Judges in this study could have been more accurate if they had 
weighted the social data of the BID more heavily as they assessed the 
meaning of the Rorschach data. It seemed to make little difference to 
judges that the Normal subjects had never required treatment and were 
productive citizens in their respective lives. It is possible that
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Rorschach accuracy might be increased if an interpreter considered the 
Rorschach data within the framework of a stereotype. Appropriate 
stereotypes would be formed on the basis of the available BID data, and 
negative Rorschach elements would be emphasized or ignored depending 
upon whether or not the subject had an absence of, or manifested commen­
surate negative signs in his actual life history. To be practical, this 
approach, of necessity, requires that we learn more about personality 
base rates, group characteristics, ethnic differentials and any other 
areas of study that will result in a thorough delineation of useful 
stereotypes.
Q-sort technique may be a helpful method for isolating group 
characteristics and base rates for different diagnostic categories. It 
has already been mentioned that Q-items were differentially and empiri­
cally associated with each of the three diagnostic groups in this study. 
Block (1961) discussed some work that has already been completed with 
mothers of schizophrenic children, and noted that item configurations 
could be isolated. Such configurations may prove to be highly reliable 
indicators of group membership and a collection of such items could com­
prise an extremely stable guide or stereotype.
It might be said the Rorschach technique cannot be uses success­
fully for all of our personality assessment needs, and base rates or 
stereotypes may prove to be more suitable for routine tasks. If that 
be the actual case, then it will be necessary for us to discover the 
specific uses and conditions under which Rorschach techniques can be 
made superior in accuracy.
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Level of Training and Accuracy
Another finding of this study that is surprising is the fact 
that experience or level of training made no difference in the judgmen­
tal accuracy of personality assessments. One of the major contentions 
of this investigation was the assertion that experts had not been given 
an opportunity to demonstrate their expertise. It was felt that prior 
research tasks were inappropriate for experts because they were either 
unfamiliar, unrealistic or too simple to allow for highly qualitative 
performances. The CQ-sort used in this study was equally comprehendable 
to undergraduates and Ph.D.'s, required familiar personality assessments 
and was highly qualitative since it affords the possibility of 43,000 
different Q-sort arrangements (Block, 1961). The ANOV produced no sig­
nificant experience effect, but the means did show an inverse trend 
between accuracy and experience.
This result was partially due to the fact that the tendency to 
emphasize pathology and utilize an inappropriate negative stereotype in­
creased as training level increased. There were also indications that 
more training led to greater risk taking. Even though Ph.D. 's and 
graduate students had the same amount of recorded errors, and many of 
the errors were identical, the Ph.D.'s were less accurate because they 
over-emphasized the meanings of the signs, tending to be extreme in 
their ratings. Risk-taking has been thoroughly discussed by Sarbin ej: 
al. (1960) as a source of clinician's judgmental inaccuracy, and 
Soskin's (1959) assertion of the emphasis on psychopathology has al­
ready been mentioned. Results on experience and accuracy in this
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investigation supported both of these mentioned research endeavors. 
Consequently, it would seem that clinicians would benefit from using a 
conservative approach to interpretation and make extreme judgments only 
where they are clearly supported by numerous bits of concommitant 
evidence,
The level of accuracy attained with minimal information was 
generally higher for less trained judges. This differential perfor­
mance could have been due to a number of factors. First, clinicians 
have learned to depend on test data and weight Rorschach evidence 
heavily. Trained judges tended to disregard helpful life data under 
the circumstances, because they were probably unfamiliar with the pre­
dictive potential of social history, even though it has been substan­
tially verified in the research literature (Winch and More 1956; Little 
and Shneidman 1959; Miller and Bieri 1963).
Secondly, the reduced accuracy of experienced judges with BID 
only, could have been due to the fact that experience can be an inter­
fering rather than a helpful factor in prediction and clinical judgment. 
In evaluating data, a clinician must choose between many alternatives 
or explanations for the same behavioral phenomenon. The likelihood of 
making an incorrect decision is greater when there are many selections 
to be made as a consequence of greater experience. On the other hand, 
the less trained judge has little or no backlog of experiences and must 
select amongst few alternatives. These alternatives have a great like­
lihood of being correct however, because if they are known to the layman 
at all, they represent events that have become familiar through constant
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recurrence and are reliable events. The clinicians may have been in­
accurate because they have selected interpretations based on rare 
events having very little reliability (Sarbin e_t £l., 1960). Thus 
better performances by the inexperienced judges does not necessarily 
mean they made better use of the Rorschach material. It could mean 
that they relied upon stereotypes which were the highly reliable 
sources of their behavioral data.
Findings on the information factor combined with the lack of 
differential effect of experience, experimentally support the wisdom 
of a growing trend to advocate the employment of the less trained 
personnel as data gatherers and psychometricians (Holt's revision of 
Rapaport, 1968). The current results further suggest that technicians 
with little training may be able to compose rapid, accurate psycho­
logical reports by utilizing a limited or shortened form of the 
Rorschach, considered within the framework of a variety of special­
ized q-sorts. This would allow the more experienced and trained prac­
titioner to become involved in less routine tasks requiring immediate 
and mature decisions, i.e., therapy with psychotic patients, crisis 
intervention, community wide conflict, etc.
Training, Accuracy and Confidence
In 1962, Oskamp advocated the study of confidence in clinical 
judgment as a possible discriminator factor in the identification of 
expertise. It was reasoned that experts would probably be more con­
fident in their judgements, but an opposite effect has obtained in a 
number of studies (Oskamp, 1962; Sperber and Alderstein, 1961; Oskamp,
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1965; Watley, 1966). The meaning of more confidence among less trained 
and accurate judges has been obscured by the fact that various re­
searches could not be directly compared. Comparison was precluded be­
cause some of the investigators employed ordinal scales (Sperber and 
Alderstein, 1961; Gordon, 1966), and others used interval scales 
(Oskamp, 1962, 1965). One of the aims of the present study was a 
clarification of the relationship between ordinal and interval data in 
reference to the expression of confidence in judgment.
Less experienced and less accurate judges over-estimated their 
obtained accuracy when asked to make a quantitative expression of con­
fidence on an interval scale. However, there were no differences 
between experience or accuracy levels when judges were asked to subjec­
tively express how they felt they had performed. Most judges indicated 
they turned in a "Fair" performance. This means that the judges were 
just as confident as each other in their feelings, but their quantita­
tive concepts of what constituted an average or fair performance 
differed. More experience would tend to render one more aware of the 
complexity of the judgmental task and result in a conservative or low 
quantitative expectation. Less experienced judges have little or no 
statistical conception of the difficulty of the task and unrealisti- 
cally expect many hits or correct judgments.
This line of reasoning helps to explain why low accurate judges 
give higher estimates than high accurate judges. It is not because 
they are more confident, but rather it is because less judgmental 
acumen goes hand in hand with miscalculating differential hit rates
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that can be expected for any given level of subjective performance.
It seemed more likely that experienced judges were more confident than 
inexperienced judges, since Ph.D.'s changed their initial confidence 
estimates least of all the groups when given the chance to do so. Re­
sults show that prior findings on confidence need to be re-considered. 
Performances obtained indicate the meaning of interval data can be 
accurately appraised only when viewed in conjunction with ordinal or 
subjective data. It is possible that Oskamp's (1962, 1965) judges 
were expressing differential levels of statistical sophistication, 
rather than differing levels of confidence in clinical judgment.
Criterion Measures
In any validity research, the acceptability of the criterion 
measure as an appropriate standard of performance will determine if 
results are meaningful or useless. The criterion utilized in this study 
was selected directly on the basis of Meehl's (1959b) assertion that 
test results can be useful only insomuch as they contributed advance 
data that would eventually be available to key personnel after pro­
longed contact with patients or subjects in the ordinary course of 
events. The criterion for this study consisted of judgments made by key 
personnel or acquaintances who knew the subject quite well. They should 
have had considerable personality data at their disposal as a result of 
prolonged contact and reasonably large samples of patient behavior.
While a good deal of agreement between judges could be obtained, 
interjudge reliability varied, and this was a weak point. When judges 
formed a homogeneous grouping, reliability was high, but when the
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heterogeneous hospital staff was used reliability was notably lowered. 
It is reasonable and to be expected that agreement on an assessment 
of the personality of a patient will be greatest when judges share the 
same training experiences and orientations. This last fact has great 
implications regarding the establishment of the predictive validity of 
the Rorschach test. It is possible that previous attempts to match 
Rorchach results with a variety of criterions have failed not because 
the Rorschach results were inaccurate, but because the two sources of 
comparison represented dissimilar and discordant methods of evaluating 
the same phenomena.
It may be unreasonable or unrealistic under such circumstances 
to expect the Rorschach results to coincide perfectly with judgments 
made by professionals in other disciplines. Moreover, if a hetero­
geneous grouping of personnel cannot agree very well on the person­
ality of a single patient, Meehl (1959b) may be mistaken when he 
indicates that first hand patient contact should make one a legitimate 
standard for predictive validity. A group of such judges should be 
used with caution, and only if it can be demonstrated that their ob­
servations are reliable and accurate, or in any event it must be shown 
that extreme biases have been controlled or accounted for. According 
to Block (1961) the reduction of the influence of such rater bias is 
best carried out by averaging ratings across judges and deriving con­
sensual judgments. He indicated that the method probably creates a 
profile that is a more accurate and objective approximation of the 
personality, than individual assessments. It seems likely that a
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consensual profile would furnish a more reasonable criterion for 
Rorschach accuracy, especially when that criterion is based upon 
judgments of personnel representing different disciplines. Such a 
criterion was used with each case in this study.
Results of the current study lend some evidence that the 
Rorschach can be used with success in selected cases, as a predictive 
device. In some of the cases in this study, judges attained coeffi­
cients of agreement that were smaller than the coefficients derived by 
correlating Rorschach with the consensual, objective CQ-sorts, for the 
same case. As an example, in case six the average coefficient of 
criterion judge agreement was .41. More than 60% of the Rorschach 
judges on case six attained a correlation of .41 or better. It would 
seem that if a Rorschach test had been obtained for this patient upon 
admission to the hospital, it would definitely have provided useful and 
meaningful material for the four judges involved, who could not agree 
very well. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that this case 
was the only case in which Rorschach correlations could consistently 
exceed criterion judge agreement correlations. Therefore, one must 
conclude that much more research needs to be completed to determine how 
the Rorschach should be refined or how Rorschach users should be trained 
to increase accuracy and validity. Some suggestions have already been 
propagated by this research.
The Hypotheses
In concluding, the results of this research can be applied to 
the formal hypotheses as follows: __
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1 - Accuracy of prediction is highly related to amount of Rorschach
data available; This hypothesis was not supported, for the minimal 
data conditions yielded the highest levels of accuracy.
2 - Less experienced judges will require greater amounts of data to
reach levels of accuracy attained by the more experienced judges;
Not supported. Less trained judges did just as well as the more 
trained judges, regardless of the amount of the data that was 
given.
3 - More Rorschach data will be required to assess less disturbed sub­
jects accurately; Not supported. Minimal data conditions were 
effective for all cases regardless of degree of the disturbance.
4 - Levels of accuracy for the more disturbed subject will be higher
than the accuracy levels attained with less disturbed subjects: 
Supported at the .01 level of significance. Psychotics could be 
more accurately assessed than either Normals or Neurotics. In 
addition, the accuracy levels for Neurotics were higher than that 
attained for the Normals.
5 - Inexperienced judges will be more accurate with the more disturbed
subjects: The converse was supported. More experienced judges
performed best with Psychotics and less experienced judges attained 
their highest relative accuracies with the Normals.
6 - There will be a positive relationship between experience and
accuracy: Not supported. The results indicate a trend describing
an inverse relationship between experience and accuracy.
7 - There will be a positive relationship between amount of data, level
of experience and degree of pathology in regard to accuracy: Not
supported. The most accurate performances were based on little 
data, were obtained by the less trained judges.
8 - Rorschach data will raise the level of accuracy significantly above
that attained on the basis of only BID: Not supported. BID sur­
passed all Rorschach conditions, save one, and at some a ,01 level 
of significance.
9 - More experienced judges will be more accurate than less trained
judges with only BID: The converse was supported. The less trained
judges attained higher accuracy with minimal data.
10- BID alone will result in more accuracy with more disturbed patients; 
Not supported. The BID condition used in isolation produced highest 
levels of accuracy with Normals and Neurotics, but not Psychotics.
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11 - More Rorschach data will be needed by inexperienced judges to
exceed accuracy attained on the basis BID alone when used by ex­
perienced judges; Not supported. The inexperienced judges did 
as well as more experienced judges on all information conditions.
12 - There will be a negative or inverse relationship between confi­
dence and accuracy; Partially supported. An inverse relationship 
obtained for the quantitative expression, but not the qualitative 
expression of confidence.
13 - There will be a positive relationship between amount of data and
level of confidence; Not supported. Confidence did not increase,
regardless of amount of information available.
14 - There will be an inverse relationship between experience level and
confidence level; Partially supported. This relationship did 
obtain for the quantitative, but not the qualitative expression of 
confidence.
Critique and Suggestions for Further Research
The outcome of this research has important implications for train­
ing and clinical practice and some of them have already been advanced 
above. It shows that we need to train our students to recognize basic 
group patterns or stereotypes, and also conditions under which it is 
inappropriate to give great weight to negative Rorschach findings. It 
is possible that students may benefit from course work stressing use of 
minimal social data and abbreviated Rorschach techniques. In addition, 
students would benefit from being taught to assess signs of health as 
well as signs of pathology on frequently used psychological instruments.
However, certain limitations of the investigation make it necessary 
to make further evaluations with caution. The design of this study was 
complex and it was impossible to fill all of the experimental cells 
more than twice. As such it was impossible to estimate the degree to 
which sampling error and idiosyncracies of the judges shaped some of
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the outcomes even though high levels of significance were obtained.
The entire experiment ideally should be replicated and the combined 
performances would then constitute a firm basis for the foregoing 
conclusions.
Although care was taken to select experts, it is impossible to 
determine to what extent any selected Ph.D. actually was outstanding 
in his capacity to utilize Rorschach techniques. Ideally one would 
have to arrange a test of skills, but this was impossible through the 
mails and because of the limited time of busy clinicians. Similarly, 
since all of the judges worked unobserved it was impossible to estimate 
if care had been taken in making judgments and this might have been 
crucial, especially in the case of practicing clinicians who might have 
been rushed and pressed for time.
The use of different subjects, subsisting under differing cir­
cumstances made it necessary to utilize criterion judges that were 
extremely diverse in terms of training, education, relationship with 
the subject, etc. It is difficult to estimate what effect this might 
have had on the formation of the consensual criterion CQ-sorts. The 
CQ-sort was selected for this study because it most satisfied the needs 
of the problem. However, judges complained of its length and indicated 
the task became extremely tedious with time. Thus a fatigue factor 
could have been responsible for reducing accuracy, in an uncontrollable 
and unknown manner. An abridged form of the CQ-sort would be helpful 
in eliminating this element.
Moreover, this study has investigated accuracy with one
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instrument, and therefore generalizations about clinician's efficacy 
have had to be made on fragmentary evidence. In reality, clinicians 
use more than one source of data to make complete personality assess­
ments in an applied setting, and accuracy would be higher than that 
which was obtainable in the present study. Nonetheless, it cannot be 
ignored that inexperienced judges did do as well as the experienced 
judges with the identical limited data sources.
This study has suggested the need for further investigation.
As already noted, there is a need to develop an abridged form of the 
CQ-sort. This could be achieved by identifying those items that are 
never used in the extreme categories, or are used in identical direc­
tions for applications to diverse groups of subjects.
If stereotypes are an important factor in personality assess­
ment, a study or a series of studies could be completed, perhaps 
utilizing the q-sort technique, that would empirically identify endur­
ing characteristics of different diagnostic groups.
Basic identifying and social history data are also important 
to consider. The BID selected for this study were effective in helping 
to produce accurate personality descriptions, but further inquiry is 
needed to determine what the most helpful types and combinations of 
such data would be.
Finally, an examination of the various procedures of the 
Rorschach technique has been completed herein. It has been shown that 
portions of the total administration make a greater contribution toward 
total accuracy than others. It is possible that selected Rorschach
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cards, or combinations of cards may have similar differential effec­
tiveness. It may be possible to isolate combinations of cards that can 
be utilized for specific purposes, or possibly a short form of the 
Rorschach could be devised for general use.
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3 4 5 6
I .38 .53 .56 .10 -.29 -.44
II .56 -.14 ,47 -.17 -.10 -.38
III .53 -.12 .41 I ro 00 .08 -.16
IV .53 -.17 -.37 -.12 .04 -.36
1 2
CASE TWO 
3 4 5 6
I .40 .20 .09 .27 .07 .32
II .15 .25 .41 .27 .17 .11
III .25 .26 .17 .10 .14 .03
IV .14 -.01 .09 .03 .24 ,01
1 2
CASE THREE 
3 4 5 6
I .19 .31 .30 .22 .16 .02
II .41 .16 .32 -.02 .26 .22
III .23 .21 .45 .10 .29 -.17
IV .34 .12 .44 .08 .30 I o
KEY: I - IV increasing amounts of Experience 




3 4 5 6
I .02 .18 -.01 .35 .23 .34
II .48 .35 -.17 .22 -.21 -.20
III .35 -.25 -.14 .19 .12 .01
IV
CMO1 -.08 .23 -.33 .31 -.03
1 2
CASE FIVE 
3 4 5 6
I .32 .21 .03 .08 .23 .10
II .22 .33 .25 .00 .12 .08
III .07 .17 -.16 .04 .05 -.02
IV .06 -.15 oo .12 1 o 00 .16
1 2
CASE SIX 
3 4 5 6
I .42 .49 .23 .32 .16 .37
II .46 .54 .41 .40 .44 .36
III .41 .48 .52 .50 .63 .67
IV .33 .55 ,26 .64 .46 .51
104




Majors and Untrained 
Undergraduates
Graduates and Untrained 
Undergraduates
Ph.D.'s and Untrained 
Undergraduates
KEY TO CHART ON FOLLOWING PAGE
P - Phenotypic Statement D - Descriptive Statement
G - Genotypic Statement I - Interpersonal Statement
Dy- Dynamic Process Statement 
T - Trait Statement
X - An error of four or more ranks








CQ-Item No. Scale 1 Scale 2 Ph.D.'s Grads Maj ors Undergrad.
2. G T X X . X X
8. G Dy X X X
9. G Dy X
10. G Dy X X
11. P I X
13. G T X X
16. G Dy X X
17. P I X
20. P D X X X
22. G Dy X
26. P D X X
28. G X X X X
29. P I X
32. G Dy X
33. P D X X X X
35. G I X X
36. G T X X
37. G T X
38. G I X X X
39. G Dy X X X X
40. G Dy X
45. G Dy X
46. G Dy X
47. G Dy X
48. P I X X
49. G I X
55. G Dy X
59. G Dy X X X
60. G Dy X X X
64. G T X
65. P D X
71. G T X X
73. G Dy X X X X
75. G Dy X X X
78. G Dy X X
86. G Dy X X
88. P D X
90. G D X X
92. G I X X X
93. P D X X
94. P D X X X
96. G T X
97. P D X







25 25 20 17
APPENDIX B
107
California Q-sort Form III
1. Is critical, skeptical, not easily impressed,
2. Is a genuinely dependable and responsible person,
3. Has a wide range of interests (N.B. Superficiality
or depth of interest is irrelevant here.)
4. Is a talkative individual.
5. Behaves in a giving way toward others. (N.B.
regardless of the motivation involved.)
6. Is fastidious.
7. Favors conservative values in a variety of areas.
8. Appears to have a high degree of intellectual
capacity. (N.B. whether actualized or not.)
(N.B. Originality is not necessarily assumed.)
9. Is uncomfortable with uncertainty and complexities,
10. Anxiety and tension find outlet in bodily symptoms.
(N.B. If placed high, implies bodily dysfunction; 
if placed low, implies absence of autonomic 
arousal.)
11. Is protective of those close to him, (N.B. Place­
ment of this item expresses behavior ranging 
from overprotection through appropriate 
nurturance to a laissez-faire, under-protective 
manner.)
12. Tends to be self-defensive.
13. Is thin-skinned; sensitive to anything that can
be construed as criticism or an interpersonal 
slight,
14. Genuinely submissive; accepts domination comfortably,
15. Is skilled in social techniques of imaginative
play, pretending and humor.
16. Is introspective and concerned with self as an
object. (N.B. introspectiveness per se does not 
imply insight.)
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17. Behaves in a sympathetic or considerate manner.
18. Initiates humor.
19. Seeks reassurance from others.
20. Has a rapid personal tempo; behaves and acts quickly,
21. Arouses nurturant feelings in others.
22. Feels a lack of personal meaning in life.
23. Extrapunitive; tends to transfer or project blame.
24. Prides self on being "objective," rational.
25. Tends toward over-control of needs and impulses;
binds tensions excessively; delays gratification 
unnecessarily.
26. Is productive; gets things done.
27. Shows condescending behavior in relations with
others. (N.B. Extreme placement toward uncharac­
teristic end implies simply an absence of 
condescension, not necessarily equalitarianism 
or inferiority.)
28. Tends to arouse liking and acceptance in people,
29. Is turned to for advice and reassurance.
30. Gives up and withdraws where possible in the
face of frustration and adversity. (N.B. If placed 
high, implies generally defeatist; if placed 
low, implies counteractive.)
31. Regards self as physically attractive.
32. Seems to be aware of the impression he makes
on others.
33. Is calm, relaxed in manner.
34. Over-reactive to minor frustrations; irritable.,
35. Has warmth; has the capacity for close relation­
ships; compassionate.
36. Is subtly negativistic; tends to undermine and
obstruct or sabotage.
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37. Is guileful and deceitful, manipulative,
opportunistic.
38. Has hostility_towards others. (N.B. Basic hostility
is intended here; mode of expression is to be 
indicated by other items.)
39. Thinks and associates to ideas in unusual ways;
has unconventional thought processes.
40. Is vulnerable to real or fancied threat,
generally fearful.
41. Is moralistic. (N.B. Regardless of the partic­
ular nature of the moral code.)
42. Reluctant to commit self to any definite course
of action; tends to delay or avoid action.
43. Is facially and/or gesturally expressive.
44. Evaluates the motivation of others in inter­
preting situations. (N.B. Accuracy of evaluation 
is not assumed.) (N.B. Extreme placement in 
direction implies pre-occupation with motiva­
tional interpretation; at the other extreme, the 
item implies a psychological obtuseness, S does 
not consider motivational factors.)
45. Has brittle ego-defense system; has a small
reserve of integration; would be disorgan­
ized and maladaptive when under stress or trauma.
46. Engages in personal fantasy and daydreams,
fictional speculations.
47. Has a readiness to feel guilty. (N.B. regard­
less of whether verbalized or not.)
48. Keeps people at a distance; avoids close
interpersonal relationships.
49. Is basically distrustful of people in general;
questions their motivations.
50. Is unpredictable and changeable in behavior
and attitudes.
51. Genuinely values intellectual and cognitive
matters. (N.B. Ability or achievement are not 
implied here,)
52. Behaves in an assertive fashion. (N,B. Item 14
reflects underlying submissiveness; this 
refers to overt behavior.)
53. Various needs tend toward relatively direct and
uncontrolled expression; unable to delay 
gratification.
54. Emphasizes being with others; gregarious.
55. Is self-defeating.
56. Responds to humor.
57. Is an interesting, arresting person.
58. Enjoys sensuous experiences (including touch,
taste, smell, physical contact).
59. Is concerned with own body and the adequacy
of its physiological functioning.
60. Has insight into own motives and behavior.
61. Creates and exploits dependency in people.
(N.B, Regardless of the technique employed, 
e.g., punitiveness, over-indulgence.) (N.B. At 
other end of scale, item implies respecting 
and encouraging the independence and 
individuality of others.)
62. Tends to be regellious and non-conforming,
63. Judges self and others in conventional terms
like "popularity," "the correct thing to do," 
social pressures, etc.
64. Is socially perceptive of a wide range of
interpersonal cues.
65. Characteristically pushes and tries to stretch
limits; sees what he can get away with.
66. Enjoys esthetic impressions; is esthetically
reactive.
67. Is self-indulgent.
68. Is basically anxious.
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69. Is sensitive to anything that can be
construed as a demand. (N.B. No implication of 
the subsequent response is intended here.)
70. Behaves in an ethically consistent manner; is
consistent with own personal standards.
71. Has high aspiration level for self.
72. Concerned with own adequacy as a person, either
at conscious or unconscious levels. (N.B. A 
clinical judgment is required here; number 74 
reflects subjective satisfaction with self.)
73. Tends to perceive many different contexts in
sexual terms; eroticizes situations.
74. Is subjectively unaware of self-concern; feels
satisfied with self.
75. Has a clear-cut, internally consistent personal­
ity. (N'.B. Amount of information available before 
sorting is not intended here.)
76.Tends to project his own feelings and motivations 
onto others.
77. Appears straightforward, forthright, candid in
dealing with others.
78. Feels cheated and victimized by life; self-pitying.
79. Tends to ruminate and have persistent, pre­
occupying thoughts.
80. Interested in members of the opposite sex. (N.B,
At opposite end implies absence of such interest.)
81. Is physically attractive; good-looking. (N.B. The
cultural criterion is to be applied here.)
82. Has fluctuating moods.
83. Able to see to the heart of important problems,
84. Is cheerful. (N.B, Extreme placement toward
uncharacteristic end of continuum implies 
unhappiness or depression.)
85. Emphasizes communication through action and
non-verbal behavior.
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86. Handles anxiety and conflicts by, in effect,
refusing to recognize their presence; repressive 
or dissociative tendencies.
87. Interprets basically simple and clear-cut situa­
tions in complicated and particularizing ways.
88. Is personally charming.
89. Compares self to others. Is alert to real or
fancied differences between self and other people.
90. Is concerned with philosophical problems; e.g.,
religions, values, the meaning of life, etc.
91. Is power oriented; values power in self or others.
92. Has social poise and presence; appears socially
at ease.
93a.Behaves in a masculine style and manner.
93b.Behaves in a feminine style and manner. (N.B.
If subject is male, 93a. applies; if subject is 
female, 93b. is to be evaluated,)(N.B. The 
cultural conception is to be applied as a 
criterion.)
94. Expresses hostile feelings directly.
95. Tends to proffer advice.
96. Values own independence and autonomy,
97. Is emotionally bland; has flattened affect.
98. Is verbally fluent; can express ideas well.
99. Is self-dramatizing; histrionic.





Please read all of the following statements. Each one is 
a description of some aspect of personality. Your task is to decide 
if a statement is Phenotypic (refers to directly observable behavior) 
or Genotypic (refers to underlying behavior, not directly observable). 
Indicate with a P or a G which type of behavior each item represents.
1 G 26 P 51 G 76 G
2 G 27 P 52 P 77 P
3 G 28 G 53 G 78 G
4 P 29 P 54 P 79 G
5 P 30 P 55 G 80 P
6 P 31 G 56 P 81 P
7 G 32 G 57 P 82 P
8 G 33 P 58 P 83 G
9 G 34 P 59 G 84 P
10 G 35 G 60 G 85 P
11 P 36 G 61 P 86 G
12 G 37 G 62 P 87 G
13 G 38 G 63 P 88 P
14 G 39 G 64 G 89 G
15 P 40 G 65 P 90 G
16 G 41 G 66 G 91 G
17 P 42 P 67 P 92 P
18 P 43 P 68 G 93 P
19 P 44 G 69 G 94 P
20 P 45 G 70 P 95 P
21 G 46 G 71 G 96 G
22 G 47 G 72 G 97 P
23 G 48 P 73 G 98 P
24 G 49 G 74 G 99 P
25 G 50 P 75 G 100 P
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Dynamic, Trait, Interpersonal, and Descriptive Statement Rating Scale 
Directions:
Please read all of the following statements. Each one is a 
description of some aspect of personality. Your task is to decide if 
a statement is dynamic (refers to underlying, psychological processes 
not directly observable), a trait (refers to a stable facet of per­
sonality that is not directly observable, but is not a defense 
mechanism or dynamic), an interpersonal (refers to behavior involving 
interactions with others), or descriptive (refers to observable aspects 
of personality that would not involve underlying processes or inter­
personal behavior) statements. Mark the letters Dy for Dynamic, D for 
descriptive, I for Interpersonal, and T for Trait next to each of the 
items when making your evaluation.
1 T 26 D 51 - T 76 Dy
2 T 27 I 52 D 77 I
3 D 28 I 53 Dy 78 Dy
4 I 29 I 54 I 79 Dy
5 I 30 D 55 Dy 80 I
6 D 31 Dy 56 I 81 D
7 T 32 Dy 57 D 82 T
8 Dy 33 D 58 D 83 D
9 Dy 34 D 59 Dy 84 D
10 Dy 35 I 60 Dy 85 D
11 I 36 T 61 I 86 Dy
12 Dy 37 T 62 D 87 Dy
13 T 38 I 63 D 88 D
14 Dy 39 Dy 64 I 89 Dy
15 I 40 Dy 65 D 90 D
16 Dy 41 I 66 T 91 T
17 I 42 D 67 T 92 I
18 D 43 D 68 Dy 93 D
19 I 44 I 69 T 94 D
20 D 45 Dy 70 D 95 I
21 I 46 Dy 71 T 96 T
22 Dy 47 Dy 72 Dy 97 D
23 Dy 48 I 73 Dy 98 D
24 T 49 I 74 Dy 99 D




Please read all of the following statements. Each one is a 
description of some aspect of personality. Your task is to order the 
deck of statements so that the top statement represents the most 
social desirable trait, the bottom statement the least socially 
desirable trait, and the statements in between would represent all 
of the intermediate degrees of social desirability.
1 5 26 9 51 7 76 5
2 9 27 4 52 5 77 8
3 7 28 7 53 3 78 1
4 5 29 8 54 6 79 4
5 8 30 2 55 2 80 7
6 5 31 6 56 6 81 6
7 6 32 6 57 8 82 5
8 8 33 7 58 6 83 8
9 4 34 3 59 5 84 6
10 4 35 9 60 7 85 5
—  11 7 36 1 61 2 86 2
12 4 37 1 62 3 87 4
13 3 38 1 63 5 88 6
14 4 39 4 64 7 89 5
15 6 40 3 65 1 90 6
16 5 41 5 66 6 91 5
17 8 42 3 67 3 92 7
18 6 43 6 68 4 93 8
19 4 44 5 69 4 94 3
20 6 45 2 70 9 95 5
21 5 46 4 71 9 96 7
22 3 47 4 72 5 97 3
23 2 48 2 73 3 98 7
24 5 49 2 74 6 99 4





The subject for case one was an unmarried, white female, 20 
years of age. She was a Junior in a State University, working toward 
a degree in Speech Therapy. She lived on campus in a dormitory, and 
had a steady boy friend. When tested expressly for the purposes of 
this study, she had never required treatment and was not then under 
treatment. She was described as a popular girl, and was named the 
Sweetheart of one of the campus Fraternities.
The judges for the criterion on this case consisted of her boy 
friend, a law student, a male from the above mentioned fraternity, and 
two Sisters from the subject's Sorority.
Case 2
The subject for case two was a 47 year old, white male, high 
school graduate, who was married 21 years. He had one son and worked 
as a state civil service employee in the capacity of a duplicating 
equipment operator. He was described as a meticulous worker and a 
dependable worker by the head of his installation. He was also 
described as being highly competent in work that included the opera­
tion of multilith presses and the creation of various technical forms. 
When tested expressly for the purposes of this study, he had never 
required treatment and was not then under treatment.
The judges for the criterion on this case consisted of the 
subject's immediate supervisor, a male, a female co-worker, and a 
female acquaintance of long standing.
Case 3
A 35 year old white female, who had been married for 20 years 
was the subject for case three. She had four children, had a high 
school diploma and was working as a secretary for an accountant. At 
the time of testing she had been in treatment for 13 months at a 
regional mental health clinic because she had been very anxious and 
was experiencing difficulties with an alcoholic husband. Her thera­
pist described her as being depressed most of the time and hysterical 
in character make-up.
The judges on the criterion for this case consisted of four 
adults that were acquaintances of the subject.
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Case 4
The subject for case four was a 27 year old white male. He 
was in the process of completing a Master's degree in Social Welfare 
at a State University. A first marriage had ended in divorce after 
four years, and a second marriage at the time of testing was 6 months 
old. Before he came to the University he had been in treatment with 
a psychiatrist in his home town because of his marital difficulties 
concerning sexual competence, self-acceptance etc. His therapist then 
advised continued treatment upon the beginning of graduate school at 
a strange place.
The judges for the criterion of this case were two of the 
subject's current group therapists, and another therapist who had 
treated the subject for one year of individual treatment. All of the 
therapists were social workers. They described the subject as being 
concerned with his adequacy as a person, highly intelligent and 
obsessive-compulsive in character.
Case 5
Case five had as its subject a 64 year old Negro female who 
was a patient at a State Hospital for the Mentally 111, for ten years 
when she was tested in conjunction with this study. Before her ill­
ness she had been a school teacher in a large metropolitan city and
had a BA degree. When she was tested she told the examiner that she 
was the Sunshine Goddess, Betty Wizard, which of course was not her 
given name. She indicated that she had 22 jobs, 11 of them coming 
directly from the President of the United States. In addition, she 
related the fact (in her mind) that she had inherited a huge fortune, 
but it had been stolen by attendants on the ward.
The judges for the criterion on this case were a Social Worker,
a Nurse, and an attendant. She (the patient) had worked steadily in 
the hospital's beauty parlor, and her supervisor was also used as a 
judge .
Case 6
The subject for case six was a white male, 24 years of age.
He completed 8 grades of school, was never married and worked as an 
oil field worker. When he was tested he was being held by law at a 
State Hospital for the Mentally 111, He had attempted to burglarize 
a general store that also had within it a U.S. Post Office, and was 
incoherent when apprehended. When he was tested he indicated that he 
did hear voices, he was a member of the Mafia, and was also the Son of
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God. Ward personnel described him as being highly volatile, attacked 
others without observable provocation and known to have urinated on 
other residents of the hospital.
The judges for this case were a Social Worker, a Nurse, an 
Attendant and an institutional counselor.
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CONSENSUAL DESCRIPTIONS, FOR THE 4 MOST EXTREME CATEGORIES
Case 1
Most Characteristic
1. Is critical, skeptical, not easily impressed,
2, Is a genuinely dependable and responsible person,
81, Is physically attractive; good-looking,
88. Is personally charming.
93. Behaves in a feminine style and manner.
Quite Characteristic 
17. Behaves in a sympathetic or considerate manner,
26. Is productive; gets things done,
33, Is calm, relaxed in manner.
35. Has warmth, has the capacity for close relationships;
compassionate,
28. Tends to arouse liking and acceptance in people.
70. Behaves in an ethically consistent manner; is consistent with 
own personal standards.
77. Appears straightforward, forthright, candid in dealing with 
others.
92. Has social poise and presence; appears socially at ease.
Extremely Uncharacteristic
36. Is subtly negativistic; tends to undermine and obstruct or
sabotage.
37. Is guileful and deceitful, manipulative, opportunistic.
38. Has hostility towards others.
49. Is basically distrustful of people in general; questions their 
motivations.
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73. Tends to perceive many different contexts in sexual terms; 
eroticizes situations.
Quite Uncharacteristic
10. Anxiety and tension find outlet in bodily symptoms.
23. Extrapunitive; tends to transfer or project blame.
27. Shows condescending behavior in relations with others.
39. Thinks and associates to ideas in unusual ways; has unconven­
tional thought processes.
61. Creates and exploits dependency in people.
62. Tends to be rebellious and non-conforming.
78. Feels cheated and victimized by life; self-pitying.
99. Is self-dramatizing; histrionic.
Case 2
Extremely Characteristic 
2, Is a genuinely dependable and responsible person
11. Is protective of those close to him.
12. Tends to be self-defensive.
13. Is thin-skinned; sensitive to anything that can be construed
as criticism or an interpersonal slight.
94. Expresses hostile feelings directly.
Quite Characteristic
1. Is critical, skeptical, not easily impressed.
20. Has a rapid personal tempo; behaves and acts quickly.
26. Is productive; gets things done.
32. Seems to be aware of the impression he makes on others.
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33. Is calm, relaxed in manner.
56. Responds to humor.
69. Is sensitive to anything that can be construed as a demand.
71. Has high aspiration level for self.
Extremely Uncharacteristic
3. Has a wide range of interests.
14. Genuinely submissive; accepts domination comfortably.
22. Feels a lack of personal meaning in life.
24. Prides self on being "objective," rational.
98. Is verbally fluent; can express ideas well.
Quite- Uncharacteristic
8. Appears to have a high degree of intellectual capacity.
27. Shows condescending behavior in relations with others.
28. Tends to arouse liking and acceptance in people.
37. Is guileful and deceitful, manipulative, opportunistic.
44. Evaluates the motivation of others in interpreting situations.
50. Is unpredictable and changeable in behavior and attitudes.
62. Tends to be rebellious and non-conforming.
Case 3
Extremely Characteristic
11. Is protective of those close to her,
17. Behaves in a sympathetic or considerate manner.
68. Is basically anxious.
82. Has fluctuating moods.
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93. Behaves in a feminine style and manner.
Quite Characteristic
4. Is a talkative individual.
9. Is uncomfortable with uncertainty and complexities.
13. Is thin-skinned; sensitive to anything that can be construed as
criticism or an interpersonal slight.
35. Has warmth; has the capacity for close relationships; compas­
sionate ,
41. Is moralistic.
56. Responds to humor,
81. Is physically attractive; good-looking.
Extremely Uncharacteristic
37. Is guileful and deceitful, manipulative opportunistic.
36. Is subtly negativistic; tends to undermine and obstruct or
sabotage.
62. Tends to be rebellious and non-conforming.
65. Characteristically pushes and tries to stretch limits; sees what 
he can get away with.
74. Is subjectively unaware of self-concern; feels satisfied with self.
Quite Uncharacteristic
20. Has a rapid personal tempo; behaves and acts quickly.
33. Is calm, relaxed in manner.
52. Behaves in an assertive fashion.
73. Tends to perceive many different contexts in sexual terms; 
eroticizes situations.
86. Handles anxiety and conflicts by, in effect, refusing to recognize 
their presence; repressive or dissociative tendencies.
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94. Expresses hostile feelings directly.
97. Is emotionally bland; has flattened affect,
100. Does not vary roles; relates to everyone in the same way.
Case 4
Extremely Characteristic
2. Is a genuinely dependable and responsible person.
60. Has insight into own motives and behavior.
71. Has high aspiration level for self.
72. Concerned with own adequacy as a person, either at conscious or
unconscious level.
96. Values own independence and autonomy.
Quite Characteristic
9. Is uncomfortable with uncertainty and complexities.
16. Is introspective and concerned with self as an object.
26. Is productive; gets things done.
51. Genuinely values intellectual and cognitive matters.
70. Behaves in an ethically consistent manner; is consistent with 
own personal standards.
75, Has a clear-cut, internally consistent personality.
80. Interested in members of the opposite sex,
92. Has social poise and presence; appears socially at ease.
Extremely Uncharacteristic
37, Is guileful and deceitful, manipulative, opportunistic.
39. Thinks and associates to ideas in unusual ways; has unconven­
tional thought processes.
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62. Tends to be rebellious and non-conforming,
86. Handles anxiety and conflicts by, in effect, refusing to recog­
nize their presence; repressive or dissociative tendencies.
97. Is emotionally bland; has flattened affect.
Quite Uncharacteristic
45. Has a brittle ego-defense system; has a small reserve of
integration; would be disorganized and maladaptive when under 
stress or trauma.
46. Engages in personal fantasy and daydreams, fictional specula­
tions .
49. Is basically distrustful of people in general; questions their
motivations.
50. Is unpredictable and changeable in behavior and attitudes.
65. Characteristically pushes and tries to stretch limits; sees what 
he can get away with.
74. Is subjectively unaware of self-concern; feels satisfied with 
self.
78. Feels cheated and victimized by life; self-pitying.
79. Tends to ruminate and have persistent, pre-occupying thoughts.
Case 5
Extremely Characteristic
39. Thinks and associates to ideas in unusual ways; has unconven­
tional thought processes.
46. Engages in personal fantasy and daydreams, fictional specula­
tions .
71. Has high aspiration level for self.
72. Concerned with own adequacy as a person, either at conscious or
unconscious levels.
90. Is concerned with philosophical problems; e.g., religious, 




8. Appears to have a high degree of intellectual capacity.
16. Is introspective and concerned with self as an object.
24. Prides self on being "objective," rational.
41. Is moralistic.
75. Has a clear-cut, internally consistent personality.
79. Tends to ruminate and have persistent, pre-occupying thoughts.
98. Is verbally fluent; can express ideas well.
Extremely Uncharacteristic 
29. Is turned to for advice and reassurance.
62. Tends to be rebellious and non-conforming.
65. Characteristically pushes and tries to stretch limits; sees what 
she can get away with.
94. Expresses hostile feelings directly.
95. Tends to proffer advice.
Quite Uncharacteristic.
18, Initiates humor.
36. Is subtly negativistic; tends to undermine and obstruct or
sabotage.
37. Is guileful and deceitful, manipulative, opportunistic.
38. Has hostility towards others.
47. Has a readiness to feel guilty.
67. Is self-indulgent.
69. Is sensitive to anything that can be construed as a demand.
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89. Compares self to others. Is alert to real or fancied differences
between self and other people.
Case 6
Extremely Characteristic
16. Is introspective and concerned with self as an object.
39. Thinks and associates to ideas in unusual ways; has conventional
thought processes.
45. Has a brittle ego-defense system; has a small reserve of integra­
tion; would be disorganized and maladaptive when under stress 
or trauma,
46. Engages in personal fantasy and daydreams, fictional speculations.
50. Is unpredictable and changeable in behavior and attitudes.
Quite Characteristic 
4. Is a talkative individual.
20. Has a rapid personal tempo; behaves and acts quickly.
31. Regards self as physically attractive.
48. Keeps people at a distance; avoids close interpersonal relation­
ships .
49. Is basically distrustful of people in general; questions their
motivations.
72. Concerned with own adequacy as person, either at conscious or
unconscious levels.
79. Tends to ruminate and have persistent, pre-occupying thoughts.
82. Has fluctuating moods.
Extremely Uncharacteristic 
2. Is a genuinely dependable and responsible person.
29. Is turned to for advice and reassurance.
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60. Has insight into own motives and behavior.
75. Has a clear-cut, internally consistent personality.
83. Able to see to the heart of important problems.
Quite Uncharacteristic 
11. Is protective of those close to him.
15. Is skilled in social techniques of imaginative play, pretending
and humor.
17. Behaves in a sympathetic or considerate manner.
26. Is productive; gets things done.
33, Is calm, relaxed in manner.
61. Creates and exploits dependency in people.
77. Appears straightforward, forthright, candid in dealing with 
others.
92. Has social poise and presence; appears socially at ease.
CONSENSUAL Q-SORT CASE 1
No. Label of Category
9 Extremely Characteristic 88 93 81 *8 *2
8 Quite Characteristic 17 26 35 92 33 70 77 28
7
rFairly Characteristic 56 80 5 19 7 41 84 60 66 29 82 11
6 Somewhat Characteristic 83 64 58 51 32 14 72 54 43 3 75 57 18 16 44 71
5 Neutral 98 86 74 21 9 69 96 * 85 79 48 31 30 24 * 6 94 47 20
4 Somewhat Uncharacteristic 4 13 52 12 15 25 42 50 63 67 89 90 95 45 22 1
3 Fairly Uncharacteristic 87 65 34 40 53 76 97 55 68 100 91 46
2 Quite Uncharacteristic 27 10 39 61 62 23 78 99
1 Extremely Uncharacteristic 49 38 73 36 $7
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CONSENSUAL Q-SORT CASE 2
No. Label of Category
9 Extremely Characteristic 2 11 12 13 94
8 Quite Characteristic 1 20 26 32 33 56 69 71
7 Fairly Characteristic 5 7 19 34 35 41 63 67 78 82 84 93
6 Somewhat Characteristic 4 16 17 18 31 39 45 47 58 60 68 76 77 85 89 96
5 Neutral 21 23 40 43 46 51 53 54 55 70 72 73 79 86 88 90 91 97
4 Somewhat Uncharacteristic 6 9 25 29 30 52 61 66 74 75 80 83 87 95 99 100
3 Fairly Uncharacteristic 10 15 36 38 42 48 49 55 57 59 81 92
2 Quite Uncharacteristic 8 27 28 37 44 50 62 64
1 Extremely Uncharacteristic 3 14 22 24 98
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CONSENSUAL Q-SORT CASE 3
No. Label of Category
9 Extremely Characteristic 68 11 17 82 93
8 Quite Characteristic 4 19 41 56 9 13 35 81
7 Fairly Characteristic 5 47 72 12 42 51 88 90 34 55 10 80
6 Somewhat Characteristic 2 32 57 7 8 18 31 76 77 87 95 28 40 45 58 69
5 Neutral 98 25 43 66 78 79 96 26 44 50 60 70 89 29 54 84 92 99
4 Somewhat Uncharacteristic 16 h 61 14 21 24 27 30 46 49 59 83 39 53 64 71
3 Fairly Uncharacteristic 3 63 1 15 23 38 67 75 85 6 48 91
2 Quite Uncharacteristic 20 33 52 73 97 100 86 94
1 Extremely Uncharacteristic 36 74- 62 65 37
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CONSENSUAL Q-SORT CASE 4
No. Label of Category
9 Extremely Characteristic 2 60 71 72 96
8 Quite Characteristic 9 16 26 51 70 75 80 92
7 Fairly Characteristic 4 6 8 17 25 32 38 47 52 64 89 98
6 Somewhat Characteristic 5 11 24 29 31 33 35 44 54 56 57 68 77 83 90 93
5 Neutral 3 7 12 19 21 28 34 43 58 59 61 63 66 81 84 88 91 95
4 Somewhat Uncharacteristic 1 10 13 14 15 18 41 42 67 69 73 76 85 87 94 99
3 Fairly Uncharacteristic 20 22 23 27 30 36 40 48 53 55 82 100
2 Quite Uncharacteristic 45 46 49 50 65 74 78 79
1 Extremely Uncharacteristic 37 39 62 86 97
CONSENSUAL Q-SORT CASE 5
No. Label of Category
9 Extremely Characteristic 39 46 71 72 90
8 Quite Characteristic 6 8 16 24 41 75 79 98
7 Fairly Characteristic 12 15 17 20 28 32 33 43 91 92 93 96
6 Somewhat Characteristic 2 4 5 11 13 22 26 49 50 51 56 57 68 70 84 97
5 Neutral 3 21 23 31 42 74 45 48 52 59 64 66 76 78 86 88 99 100
4 Somewhat Uncharacteristic 7 9 14 19 27 30 35 40 44 53 54 55 60 77 80 83
3 Fairly Uncharacteristic 1 10 25 34 58 61 63 73 82 81 85 87
2 Quite Uncharacteristic 18 36 37 38 47 67 69 89
1 Extremely Uncharacteristic 29 62 65 94 95
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consensual Q-SORT CASE 6
No. Label of Category
9 Extremely Characteristic 16 39 45 46 50
8 Quite Characteristic 4 20 31 48 49 72 79 82
7 Fairly Characteristic 9 28 38 40 43 52 68 73 80 85 87 94
6 Somewhat Characteristic 8 13 19 34 36 41 42 47 53 59 67 69 76 81 84 86
5 Neutral 6 12 23 27 32 30 52 54 63 65 66 74 88 90 91 93 99 100
4 Somewhat Uncharacteristic 1 3 5 7 14 21 22 24 44 55 56 57 58 70 97 98
3 Fairly Uncharacteristic 10 18 25 35 37 51 64 71 78 89 95 96
2 Quite Uncharacteristic 11 15 17 26 33 61 77 92
1 Extremely Uncharacteristic 2 29 60 75 83
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Consensual CQ-sort Case 1
1 4 26 8 51 6 76
2 9 27 2 52 4 77
3 6 28 8 53 3 78
4 4 29 7 54 6 79
5 7 30 5 55 3 80
6 5 31 5 56 7 81
7 7 32 6 57 6 82
8 9 33 8 58 6 83
9 5 34 3 59 5 84
10 2 35 8 60 7 85
11 7 36 1 61 2 86
12 4 37 1 62 2 87
13 4 38 1 63 4 88
14 6 39 2 64 6 89
15 4 40 3 65 3 90
16 6 41 7 66 7 91
17 8 42 4 67 4 92
18 6 43 6 68 3 93
19 7 44 6 69 5 94
20 5 45 4 70 8 95
21 5 46 3 71 6 96
22 4 47 5 72 6 97
23 2 48 5 73 1 98
24 5 49 1 74 5 99







Consensual CQ-sort Case 2
1 8 26 8 51 5
2 9 27 2 52 4
3 1 28 2 53 5
4 6 29 4 54 5
5 7 30 4 55 3
6 4 31 6 56 8
7 7 32 8 57 3
8 2 33 8 58 6
9 4 34 7 59 3
10 3 35 7 60 6
11 9 36 3 61 4
12 9 37 2 62 2
13 9 38 3 63 7
14 1 39 6 64 2
15 3 40 5 65 5
16 6 41 7 66 4
17 6 42 3 67 7
18 6 43 5 68 6
19 7 44 2 69 8
20 8 45 6 70 5
21 5 46 5 71 8
22 1 47 6 72 5
23 5 48 3 73 5
24 1 49 3 74 4

































Consensual CQ-sort Case 3
1 3 26 5 51 7 76
2 6 27 4 52 2 77
3 3 28 6 53 4 78
4 8 29 5 54 5 79
5 7 30 4 55 7 80
6 3 31 6 56 8 81
7 6 32 6 57 6 82
8 6 33 2 58 6 83
9 8 34 7 59 4 84
10 7 35 8 60 5 85
11 9 36 1 61 4 86
12 7 37 1 62 1 87
13 8 38 3 63 3 88
14 4 39 4 64 4 89
15 3 40 6 65 1 90
16 4 41 8 66 5 91
17 9 42 7 67 3 92
18 6 43 5 68 9 93
19 8 44 5 69 6 94
20 2 45 6 70 5 95
21 4 46 4 71 4 96
22 4 47 7 72 7 97
23 3 48 3 73 2 98
24 4 49 4 74 1 99














































Consensual CQ-sort Case 4
1 4 26 8 51 8 76
2 9 27 3 52 7 77
3 - 5 28 5 53 3 78
4 7 29 6 54 6 79
5 6 30 3 55 3 80
6 7 31 6 56 6 81
7 5 32 7 57 6 82
8 7 33 6 58 5 83
9 8 34 5 59 5 84
10 4 35 6 60 9 85
11 6 36 3 61 5 86
12 5 37 1 62 1 87
13 4 38 7 63 5 88
14 . 4 39 1 64 7 89
15 4 40 3 65 2 90
16 8 41 4 66 5 91
17 7 42 4 67 4 92
18 4 43 5 68 6 93
19 5 44 6 69 4 94
20 3 45 2 70 8 95
21 5 46 2 71 9 96
22 3 47 7 72 9 97
23 3 48 3 73 4 98
24 6 49 2 74 2 99
25 7 50 2 75 8 100
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Consensual CQ-sort Case 5
1 3 26 6 51 6 76
2 6 27 4 52 5 77
3 5 28 7 63 4 78
4 6 29 1 54 4 79
5 6 30 4 55 4 80
6 8 31 5 56 6 81
7 4 32 7 57 6 82
8 8 33 7 58 3 83
9 4 34 3 59 5 84
10 3 35 4 60 4 85
11 6 36 2 61 3 86
12 7 37 2 62 1 87
13 6 38 2 63 3 88
14 4 39 9 64 5 89
15 7 40 4 65 1 90
16 8 41 8 66 5 91
17 7 42 5 67 2 92
18 2 43 7 68 6 93
19 4 44 4 69 2 94
20 7 45 5 70 6 95
21 5 46 9 71 9 96
22 6 47 2 72 9 97
23 5 48 5 73 3 98
24 8 49 6 2k 5 99











































Consensual CQ-sort Case 6
1 4 26 2 51 3 76
2 1 27 5 52 5 77
3 4 28 7 53 6 78
4 8 29 1 54 5 79
5 4 30 5 55 4 80
6 5 31 8 56 4 81
7 4 32 5 57 4 82
8 6 33 2 58 4 83
9 7 34 6 59 6 84
10 3 35 3 60 1 85
11 2 36 6 61 2 86
12 5 37 3 62 7 87
13 6 38 7 63 5 88
14 4 39 9 64 3 89
15 2 40 7 65 5 90
16 9 41 6 66 5 91
17 2 42 6 67 6 92
18 3 43 7 68 7 93
19 6 44 4 69 6 94
20 8 45 9 70 4 95
21 4 46 9 71 3 96
22 4 47 6 72 8 97
23 5 48 8 73 7 98
24 4 49 8 74 5 99




























Many thanks for consenting to cooperate in this research endeavor. 
Below you will find an outline guide to the procedure to use with the 
enclosed materials.
THE PROCEDURE AT A GLANCE 
STEP 1. READ instruction sheet,
STEP 2. EVALUATE the subject's identifying information and
whatever psychological data that is provided
STEP 3. RATE the personality items in the Q-deck.
STEP 4. RECORD your ratings.
STEP 5. FILL-IN the biographical data form.
When you have completed the above steps, MAIL the PERSON­
ALITY ITEMS, THE RECORDING SHEET, and the BIOGRAPHICAL DATA FORM.
Sincerely,
Irwin Gadol, M.S.
Joseph G. Dawson, Ph.D. 
Professor of Psychology
P.S. Due to the press of time it is necessary to request that an 
attempt be made to complete the procedure within two weeks 
after receipt of the packet.
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* INSTRUCTIONS
Your task is to describe the personality of an individual, as 
accurately as you can, solely on the basis of available data, as it 
is provided, WITHOUT ANY FURTHER ALTERATION OR MANIPULATION, using the 
100 items on the enclosed cards. Each item consists of a trait or 
aspect of personality and you should read the entire set before 
proceeding further to familiarize yourself with the content and range 
of the items. You are to sort these items into nine categories 
ranging from extremely characteristic to extremely uncharacteristic. 
The table below lists the number of each category, what it represents, 
and the exact number of items that must be placed into each category.
Category No. Label of Category No.of Cards
9 Extremely Characteristic 5
8 Quite Characteristic 8
7 Fairly Characteristic 12
6 Somewhat Characteristic 16
5 Relatively Neutral 18
4 Somewhat Uncharacteristic 16
3 Fairly Uncharacteristic 12
2 Quite Uncharacteristic 8
1 Extremely Uncharacteristic 5
A convenient method of sorting is to form three stacks of cards 
- those items deemed characteristic being placed on one side, those 
items deemed uncharacteristic placed on the other side, and those cards 
remaining, falling in between. No attention need be paid to the number 
of cards falling into each of these three groupings at this time. When 
the three piles of cards have been established they may be further 
graded into the necessary proportions as outlined in the table above. 
When you have completed sorting the cards, please re-read the entire 
order to make certain they are in the arrangement you intend.
Next, please record the number of each item that you wish to 
include in a given category in the labeled boxes of the recording 
sheet provided in this packet. To insure that the order of the cards 
is preserved, secure the set with the provided rubberband. Next, fill 
in the accompanying Clinician's BIOGRAPHICAL DATA SHEET, without pro­
viding your name (unless you wish to have a summary of the completed 
research mailed to you at a later date).
The procedure is complete when you have mailed the CARDS, the 
RECORDING SHEET, and the CLINICIAN'S BIOGRAPHICAL DATA SHEET, in the 
self-addressed envelop in the packet. Since the success of this 
research depends upon your ratings, please be certain the sorting order 
is concise and exactly as you intend it to be. YOUR COOPERATION IN 
THIS RESEARCH IS GREATLY APPRECIATED.
RECORDING SHEET FOR 100 ITEMS






4 Somewhat Uncharacteristic 
3 Fairly Uncharacteristic 
2 Quite Uncharacteristic 
1 Extremely Uncharacteristic
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CLINICIAN'S BIOGRAPHICAL DATA SHEET
NOTE: DO NOT READ THIS SHEET until you have completed the sorting
process and are ready to complete the entire procedure by 
providing biographical data about YOURSELF (not the subject).
1. What is your highest level of education? _______________________
2. If you possess a degree(s), list the year it was awarded and the 
awarding institution(s):
3. If you are not currently a student, indicate what type of work you 
do, your job title, and a short description of your duties:
4. List the average number of Rorschachs you normally administer on 
a monthly basis:
5. Estimate the number of Rorschachs you have administered since your 
first course in the technique:
6. List the year that you had your first course in the Rorschach 
technique:
7. Do you currently practice therapy? ____________________________
8. List the number of hours that you would normally devote to the 
practice of therapy on a monthly basis;
9. Indicate if you have ever received therapy, and for what length 
of time;
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10. List your marital status:  _______________________ .
11. If you are married, indicate if you have children and their ages:
12. Indicate the sibling position you occupy and the number of 
children in your original, immediate family (i.e., 2nd of 5 
children).
13. How many of the personality items in this research do you believe 
you have placed into correct categories:
14. Using the five point scale below, and circling one number, 
how well do you feel you were able to do in this task?:
VERY WELL FAIR VERY POORLY
1 2 3 4 5
15. Research shows those judges who have attained high levels of 
training tend to be conservative in their estimates, while judges 
with less training tend to be over-confident and over-estimate 
their efforts. Keeping this in mind, please estimate the number 
of items you believe you have placed into correct categories once 
again;
16. What diagnosis do you believe is most appropriate for the subject?:
17. Indicate the reasons that have (or have not) participated in this 
research:
18. List your name and address below, if you wish to have a follow-up 
summary sent to you:
19. Please write any comments you wish to make on the reverse side of 
this page, and thank you for your time and interest.
VITA
Irwin Gadol was born in Brooklyn, New York, on June 26, 1936, 
and was the second of three children born to Sylvia and Nathan Gadol. 
He was educated in the Public School system of New York City, and 
graduated from the High School of Art and Design in 1954 with a major 
in Commercial Illustration. After serving two years in the U.S. Army, 
he attended Brooklyn College from 1956 to 1960 and earned a BA degree. 
An MS degree in Clinical Psychology was earned at City College of New
A
York from 1960 to 1%3.
He was married to Ann Weinberg in 1960 and has two children, 
Steven and Suzanne.
Doctoral work was begun at LSU in 1964, and he served as a 
Research Assistant from 1964 to 1966, and a USPHS Fellow from 1967 to 
1968. He was an NIMH Trainee while completing an internship at the 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical School at Dallas from 1966 
to 1967. He is a candidate for the Doctoral degree during the 1968 
Summer Commencement.
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